Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection

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On 2/10/2021 11:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 09:56:40AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is enabled, legacy
non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
  arch/x86/Kconfig           | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
  arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
  2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f851179ff0..1138b5fa9b4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86_64
  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
  	select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
  	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
  	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
  	select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
@@ -1951,6 +1952,28 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N. +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_CET
+	prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on X86_64

This depends isn't needed any more. With that fixed:

Yes, that's right.  I will remove it.


Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>


Thanks!

--
Yu-cheng



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