> > I don't believe that is true. There are many examples of deployments that > have a private mapping system which is not accessible by just anyone, For > instance, in multi tenant virtualization it is imperative that tenants are not > able to access the mapping system-- if they were then the whole concept of > virtual network isolation starts to breaks done. Mapping systems are already > by protected using ACLs, authentication, network isolation, etc. > > Tom > I thought one concern raised here wasn't that the information couldn't be secured, but that the owner or operator of the mapping system could collude with dark forces to turn its information against you, in which case all bets are off. Assuming for a moment that we have an operator who does not collude with dark forces and does want to secure access to the mapping system and information, one question concerns how the access is controlled - just to the mapping system as a whole, or at the level of individual records. Is this level of differentiation provided (which can be important if I want to protect e.g. my locator information from some, but not all users)? --- Alex