On Apr 14, 2011, at 5:01 AM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > On Apr 14, 2011, at 9:17 AM, Brian E Carpenter wrote: > >> On 2011-04-14 06:19, Bob Hinden wrote: >>> Olaf, >>> >>> On Apr 2, 2011, at 1:28 AM, Olaf Kolkman wrote: >>> >>>> [as editor:] >>>> >>>> It seems that the high order bit of this discussion circles >>>> around the question on whether it a requirement for the >>>> IETF Chair to have a voting position in order to >>>> effectively perform oversight. Once we figured out where we >>>> want to go with that we can think about delegation by the >>>> chair vs appointment by the bodies and the implementation >>>> details with respect to the trust. >>> >>> For the record, I don't agree with this summary. That is, I >>> still question the basic assumption in the proposal. We have >>> "running code" in the IASA model and it appears to work >>> reasonable well. Not perfect, of course. In particular I >>> think that having the IETF chair, IAB chair, and ISOC >>> president as voting members of the IAOC (and IETF Trust) has >>> worked very well. It makes them an active part of decisions >>> the IAOC and IETF Trust are making and helps keep the IAOC >>> from getting disconnected from the community. It also makes >>> them share the responsibility for decisions by having their >>> vote be publicly recorded. >> >> I agree. I think this responsibility should not be delegated. >> It's fundamental to the success of the IETF (and the ISOC for >> that matter - the IETF is a major source of ISOC's legitimacy). >> The IAOC delegates execution to the IAD etc. - maybe the real >> bug is that the IAOC itself needs to delegate more? >> > > > > I agree the IASA model is working well and I also agree that the chairs have played an important role. > > But I am not convinced that it is the only way to keep the IAOC from getting disconnected from the community. To turn that argument around: If it is the case that we need the IAB chair, IETF chair and ISOC president [iChiefs] to keep the IAOC on track then why do we have NOMCOM appointments? One could easily argue that the NOMCOM appointments are made to keep the IAOC connected to the community. > > I also do not see why it 'it's fundamental to the success of the IETF'. I do agree that the iChiefs need to understand what is going on, there is no dispute about, but I question whether IAOC membership is best and most efficient instrument. > > > >>> I also don't understand what the effect of the proposal is on >>> the IETF Trust. Currently all IAOC members are members of >>> the IETF Trust. They have to sign a letter accepting this >>> role. I don't think it can then be delegated. >> >> It can't be delegated. However, a duly approved update to BCP101 >> can change the definition of the formal membership of the >> IAOC, and that would automatically change the membership of >> the Trust. An alternative would be a formal change to the Trust >> Agreement, but since IANAL, I don't know whether a change to >> allow delegation or proxies would be possible under the law of >> the Commonwealth of Virginia, where the Trust was established. >> > > I do not want to brush over this important detail. But, let us first figure out what we want with the IAOC. If there is no consensus on having the iChiefs play a less involved role then fine tuning the details doesn't make sense. If we gain consensus then fixing the Trust is doable. > Please note that, as I am sure you are aware, the consensus that would have to be gained to modify the Trust agreement is among the Trustees. >>> >>> Your draft focuses on one area (that is, reducing the burden >>> of these positions), but does not discuss any other aspects >>> of making this change. What might the negative aspects of >>> delegating this responsibility be? How will this be dealt >>> with? > > Help me out. > > The main _potential_ negative aspect is a drop of iChiefs' awareness of what is going on; and the ability to directly influence decisions. > I think that you are neglecting the potential impact on the IAOC/Trust. When the IETF Chair or the IAB Chair speaks in the IAOC or the Trust on a matter in their area of responsibility, their words carry a lot of weight. Their representative will inevitably lose some of that weight, and their use will thus change the balance in the IAOC and the Trust. Suppose, for example, that the iChief in question has been negotiating some issue with the US DoC or the ITU or ICANN or a potential host country's IT Ministry. Such negotiations frequently impact either the IAOC or the Trust (or both) - in terms of the budget, sponsors, meeting locations, etc. Will their IAOC/Trust representative be part of any such negotiations as a matter of course ? If not, then they will not speak authoritatively about them. No matter how carefully they are briefed, there may be matters arising that the briefing did not anticipate. That will for sure delay matters (as questions will have to them be relayed back and forth) and may adversely affect the decisions made (when the representative thinks that they fully understand some issue, and do not). Regards Marshall > >>> >>> Each of the positions (IETF Chair, IAB chair, ISOC President) >>> are different in the way they are selected and this effects >>> their ability to delegate their responsibility and who they >>> might delegate it to. For example, the IETF chair is >>> selected by the NOMCOM and one of his/her responsibilities is >>> to sit on the IAB, IAOC, and IETF Trust. The IAB chair is >>> selected by the IAB. The ISOC president is hired by the ISOC >>> Board of Trustees. Consequently, I think the authority to >>> delegate differs and they should be considered separately. > > I agree, this needs discussion. But lets first see if there is any consensus on going down the path of getting the iChiefs out day-to-day IAOC business. > > >>> >>>> [as olaf:] >>>> >>>> I agree that the IETF chair needs to have a good oversight >>>> about what goes on in the IETF, to a lesser extend it is >>>> good that the IAB has that oversight too (specifically with >>>> respect to its chartered responsibilities) but I wonder if >>>> a voting membership is the appropriate instrument. >>> >>> Why not? It does appear to work. > > > > Yes it works. But it consumes a lot of time too. IAOC retreat, meetings at the IETF, regular tele-chats, participation in sub committees, etc, etc... > > We have a responsibility to our leadership to make their jobs scalable and manageable. We need to have our leadership positions accessible to our peers, who may not have the support of their company for more than a half time job, or, not to forget, may not have the support of their families for the travel and the long evenings with telechats. Being effective in what committees and meetings one participates in is part of making the job scalable. > > The Best Current Practice is that the iChiefs _must_ participate in the IAOC, I like that _must_ being removed. > > >>> >>>> I believe effective oversight depends on having the >>>> appropriate high level information and having the >>>> opportunity to timely inject information that is needed to >>>> steer an outcome. An alternative method for sharing and >>>> injecting is having regular meetings between the I* chairs >>>> and the ISOC President/CEO. I believe that such meetings >>>> are much more effective for the parties involved than being >>>> exposed to all details. >>> >>> Do we really need to have another regular meeting? Would >>> this give the I* chairs more authority than they have now? >>> Sort of an executive committee. Would these meetings be >>> public, have votes, have public minutes? > > > It is not another meeting, it is replacing a lot of other meetings by one regular meeting that talks about issues at the right level of detail. Also, sharing information is not decision making. Russ and I had weekly calls planned (we didn't have them weekly, but that aside) to share information and brainstorm about potential issues. > > I don't see the 'more authority' argument, not in the context where one argues for direct votes in order to get effective oversight. I think that having a weekly iChiefs meeting gives less formal authority and (yes) a bit more informal authority. > > >>>> This only an illustration of an instrument, there may be >>>> other instruments for oversight as well. But I do not think >>>> the ex-officio membership is the only method. >>> >>> It's not perfect but it is the one we have now and it is >>> working. We should only change it if we are sure that it >>> will improve the overall IASA operation. I am seriously >>> concerned about the current proposal. > > > My question is whether there is any will to pursue a change to the BCP to work towards removing the _must_. (The Best Current Practice is that the iChiefs _must_ participate in the IAOC, I like that _must_ being removed.) > > I have seen Brian and Bob argue against. And not very many people argue 'for' > > - --Olaf > > > ________________________________________________________ > > Olaf M. Kolkman NLnet Labs > http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ > I will start to use a new PGP key (ID 0x3B6AAA64) at the beginning > of May 2011. > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) > Comment: This message is locally signed. > Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org > > iEYEARECAAYFAk2muAIACgkQtN/ca3YJIocKGwCggV3Z5um2cmWrUdXcba19SLNr > cH4AoI0vilyFYRIa5Bx1j6i7T45klrYs > =F6bJ > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > Ietf mailing list > Ietf@xxxxxxxx > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf