Eliot, Adam's response to you have covered almost everything I would have said and probably done so better than I have but I want to focus on one suggestion from you that he did not address. Sadly, it exposes the tip of an iceberg and this note is going to be longer than I might wish.. --On Sunday, 02 October, 2022 09:08 +0200 Eliot Lear <lear@xxxxxxx> wrote: >... > I would much rather that we redid BCP 83 to reflect this, that > the matter fall to the IETF chair to resolve, and that that > person should have some freedom of action, so long as it > proposed and reported to the IESG. This can result in better > outcomes and can be effected more quickly. While there is a > risk of abuse of power, that risk is mitigated by having a > handful of people with different perspectives review the > proposed action. I think putting that much authority into the hands of one individual would be a mistake, even if only from the standpoint of appearances. We've had one (very recent) incident of name calling addressed to the IETF Chair. We've also had incidents longer ago in which the IETF Chair was (justifiably or not) accused of weaponizing the SAA process to suppress opinions that disagreed with theirs. Having the chair consult the IESG as you suggest helps, but the IESG has, historically, not been immune from feeling attacked and put-upon by assorted actors either. Until the criteria the Nomcom considers include unlimited and saintly patience, wisdom, and judgment of IETF Chair candidates -- considers as _the_ most important criterion for selection decisions -- I think BCP 83, plus or minus some minor tuning, is about as good as we are going to get. If nothing else, I would rather the Nomcom focus its attention on current criteria for IESG roles rather than going on a hunt for characteristics that are uncommon in mere mortals. Part of that goes to the root of the real tensions I see in the present case (and several others that might have been candidates for PR-rights actions but, at least so far, have not been). Consider two cases. In one, someone is being abusive and disruptive _and_ has nothing substantive to say about the IETF's technical work or procedures. In the other, their positions/remarks are relevant, carefully thought-out (even if not perfectly explained) but inconsistent with mainstream IETF opinions as understood and expressed by "the leadership". When those views are couched in or accompanied by [what we judge to be] uncomfortable or abusive language, personal attacks, and the like, we have a problem. The first case is easy. Ideally the second should not be treated any differently from the first, but we need to be extremely careful that our response is to the language, style, and degree of disruption and not to the differences in views or substantive disagreements. That is never going to be easy or pleasant. Painful as it may be, the only possible remedies I can see for lingering concerns about IETF leadership, in-groups, or cabals using PR-actions to suppress views that disagree with theirs are transparency and community decisions, not decisions made in private by an individual or small group. That said, I agree with your preference for handling things quickly and in private. As Adam pointed out, BCP 83 is quite clear that it is a last resort and not a first step. As a first step, it would be a disaster. If I were to recommend changes at this point (not necessarily to the text of BCP 83), most of them would be the result of changes in the IETF in the more than 18 years since RFC 3683 was published: (1) The spec should be more clear that, once a PR-action is taken that cites one or more specific mailing lists, administrators of other lists MAY shut the offender out of them without further iterative procedures or private consultations. Note MAY and hot SHOULD or MUST. (2) The effects of an action should extend beyond the specifics of a mailing list. Someone sanctioned under BCP 83 should not be able to end-run the process by, e.g., making GITHUB postings or, probably, posting Internet Drafts. Especially in these days or remote participation, we should also consider whether the sanctions should apply to the ability to register for meetings or even maintain an active datatracker account (fwiw, if the answer is "yes", it interacts with the difference between anonymous passive observers and registered attendees with fee waivers). (3) The SAA procedures should make it clear that, if they believe they have exhausted all other remedies and further action is justified, they are obligated to make a recommendation to the IESG for a PR-action (rather than continuing with options that don't work or throwing up their hands in despair). From discussions with them over the last few months, they do not believe that their procedures give them the authority to make such a recommendation, much less the responsibility to do so. The IESG obviously does not have to agree with a recommendation from them (or anyone else), but, if the SAA team believes that there is a problem and they are otherwise at the end of their options, the problem should be escalated. While the procedures are less formal (and should probably stay that way), much the same advice (as advice, not mandate) should be given to WG Chairs and others who are managing/ monitoring/ policing other mailing lists: do whatever can be done in private discussions and counseling, but, if, after serious efforts, nothing works in changing the behavior, bring the matter to the IESG's attention and recommend that they consider action. FWIW, those types of provisions for escalation could be part of the solution to "why did this take so long?" concerns. (4) Whether formalized or not, anyone who has been trying to work with the problems in private and reaching the point where an escalation seems appropriate should explicitly warn the person involved that, if they do not immediately agree to clean up their acts and follow through on that, a recommendation about PR-action will soon follow. Similarly, the IESG should, as the last step before posting a Last Call announcement for a PR-action, be sure to notify the individual involved and solicit a response and/or commitments to behavior changes. I believe that, in most of the cases where actions have been initiated under RFC 3683, that has been done However, no one whose past behavior and at least the fact of prior discussions about it are about to be subjected to formal public view and discussions should be surprised when that occurs. (5) Finally, in posing a PR-rights Last Call, the IESG should try very hard to focus on disruptive behaviors and avoid pulling unpopular positions into the discussion. In practice, I think we/they have done fairly well at that but, as demonstrated in some comments on this thread, the line can get rather thin and efforts to make the distinction clear will always be worthwhile. best, john -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
