On Wed, 2008-11-12 at 21:05 +0100, Enrico Scholz wrote: > > This thread is about a *server* SIG, isn't it? Most servers do not need > disk encryption as they are located in physically secured rooms. They > must be able to reboot without manual interaction too. > > Hence, when password prompts are the only reason for plymouth, then > plymouth should be optional; especially when it has heavy dependencies > like pango. Don't be so sure about that. In a colo environment I /would/ want some encryption on the disk, and if I have to use a remote kvm to input the passphrase at reboot time, that's OK. Reboots are either planned events, or emergencies, both of which are going to require the attention of the people who have the passphrase. -- Jesse Keating Fedora -- Freedom² is a feature! identi.ca: http://identi.ca/jkeating
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