On Wednesday, 12 November 2008 at 21:09, Jesse Keating wrote: > On Wed, 2008-11-12 at 21:05 +0100, Enrico Scholz wrote: > > > > This thread is about a *server* SIG, isn't it? Most servers do not need > > disk encryption as they are located in physically secured rooms. They > > must be able to reboot without manual interaction too. > > > > Hence, when password prompts are the only reason for plymouth, then > > plymouth should be optional; especially when it has heavy dependencies > > like pango. > > Don't be so sure about that. In a colo environment I /would/ want some > encryption on the disk, and if I have to use a remote kvm to input the > passphrase at reboot time, that's OK. And don't worry about sniffers attached to the KVM. Why would you? Who decided that it was a jolly good idea to make plymouth essential? I don't need a fancy progress bar that drags in tens of MBs of dependencies, thank you. After all, nobody is going to see it anyway. Regards, R. -- Fedora http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/User:Rathann RPMFusion http://rpmfusion.org | MPlayer http://mplayerhq.hu "Faith manages." -- Delenn to Lennier in Babylon 5:"Confessions and Lamentations" -- fedora-devel-list mailing list fedora-devel-list@xxxxxxxxxx https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/fedora-devel-list
