Re: F28 System Wide Change: Reduce Initial Setup Redundancy

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On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 8:12 AM, Michael Catanzaro <mcatanzaro@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> On 12/05/2017 07:30 AM, Dominik 'Rathann' Mierzejewski wrote:
>>
>> Then why disable root at all? What if there are no local user accounts,
>> only via a directory service and network is down? This change is clearly
>> not well thought-out. If anything, the redundancy should be reduced on
>> the GNOME side, not anaconda side, as removing stuff from anaconda
>> forces alternative desktop environments to reimplement what GNOME does.
>
>
> We've spend a fair amount of time discussing this change for the past two
> years (including just a few months ago on this list), so I don't think it's
> fair to say it is not well thought-out. Setting up such an environment
> requires significant custom configuration. If you know how to enable a
> directory service for logins, which is not supported by any graphical tools,
> then you surely know how to set a root password using passwd. The default
> Workstation configuration is not relevant in this scenario for that reason
> alone. Also consider that computers in such an environment are probably
> installed via kickstart or netinstall anyway, which are unaffected by this
> change, or at least by a system administrator who can set a root password if
> desired. Not by end users.
>
> The default install in Fedora Workstation should be optimized for a single,
> local, administrator user. Having a separate root account enabled is not
> useful and only leads to confusion. Users do not understand the difference
> between their administrator password and their separate root password.
> Prompting users to set two different passwords at install time is confusing
> and problematic.


I agree with all of this. But there is that nitpicky "what if" that
becomes problematic.

At the moment I'm finding the enforcement of root login in systemd to
be kinda specious because literally anyone trying to compromise a
system they have physical access to, can do this trivially. You can
rd.break=pre-mount and you're dumped to a prompt with root access. You
can likewise do the same with init=/bin/bash. So?? What's the security
advantage of rescue and emergency targets putting up a login at all?

I do keep root user enabled on my laptop but I think that's
antiquated, I usually use 'sudo -i' rather than literally logging in
as root user. On my Fedora Server, root user is locked (/etc/shadow
passphrase is !). So my only concern is the single user startup
scenario where systemd enforces a root login for reasons that I'm
uncertain about.

-- 
Chris Murphy
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