Re: Security context of shared libraries

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On 11/07/2016 10:11 AM, mm19827 wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/07/2016 04:01 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>
>> I suppose that's true, depending on what it is that you have to allow
>> between foo_t and bar_t, e.g. you can allow foo_t to connect to a bar_t
>> socket or similar without allowing it to connect to unconfined_t
>> sockets.
> Exactly.
> 
>  If you truly want bar_t to be unconfined, you can always just
>> have it call the unconfined_domain() interface in refpolicy, e.g.
>> unconfined_domain(bar_t), and it will inherit all of the unconfined
>> domain rules.
>>
> Thanks for the info.
> It would be great (and this would be my last question), if you could
> give a pointer to a complete documentation of refpolicy macros and
> interfaces - I could find the kernel rules, and that it makes use of m4
> macros, but not a complete documentation.

http://oss.tresys.com/docs/refpolicy/api/

It is generated from the refpolicy sources.

refpolicy  mailing list is a better place to ask questions about
refpolicy, see
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy

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