Re: utility of URNs and DNSSEC (was: Re: URNs and Last Call: <draft-nottingham-rfc7320bis-02.txt> (URI Design and Ownership) to Best Current Practice)

Rob Sayre <sayrer@xxxxxxxxx> · Wed, 8 Jan 2020 22:31:00 -0800

On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 6:21 PM Keith Moore <moore@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

    On 1/7/20 8:41 PM, Rob Sayre wrote:

      Definitions
        of success vary. URNs are widely used in the information

        sciences (e.g., national libraries), but that isn't as visible
        as the web.

      Definitions of success do indeed vary. Without weighing in on
        this particular issue, the IETF does seem to be clinging to
        unsuccessful standards like URNs and DNSSEC. That doesn't mean
        they're bad, but it does mean those standards missed the mark in
        ways that would have been difficult to predict at the time they
        were drafted. This failure to reflect is disappointing.

    Actually, it means no such thing.

Check out the footnote in

https://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence-reports-documents/2019-2/avoiding-unintended-harm-to-internet-infrastructure/ 

At the very least, one might concede that the usefulness of DNSSEC is a matter of debate.

I actually happen to think DNSSEC might be useful once DNS transports are encrypted, which the IETF has screwed up for 30 years. However, the DNSSEC RFC is 15 years old, so I don't think it's generally productive to bring up in new work.

thanks,
Rob