Lloyd, On 01/04/2014 12:45 AM, l.wood@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote: > "Please include a full explanation of how pervasive monitoring is > mitigated in this protocol. If this protocol is not fully > cryptographically secure to defeat pervasive monitoring, explain why > not." What are you quoting? That text is *not* part of the draft, nor do I recall it being sent to the list by anyone. Surely inventing quotes is not fair game here? S. > > Yeah, that gives complete design control to the security AD. > > Which problem is being addressed, exactly? > > Lloyd Wood http://about.me/lloydwood > ________________________________________ From: ietf > [ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Stewart Bryant (stbryant) > [stbryant@xxxxxxxxx] Sent: 03 January 2014 20:36 To: Melinda Shore > Cc: ietf@xxxxxxxx Subject: Re: Last Call: > <draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02.txt> (Pervasive Monitoring is an > Attack) to Best Current Practice > > I have been wondering whether a simple update to "A Guide to Writing > A Security Considerations Section" is all that is needed to address > the problem in hand? > > Stewart > > Sent from my iPad > >> On 3 Jan 2014, at 19:00, "Melinda Shore" <melinda.shore@xxxxxxxxx> >> wrote: >> >>> On 1/3/14 8:33 AM, Eric Rosen wrote: One has to look at the >>> likely impact of the draft, not merely at the intentions of the >>> authors. >> >> I don't know if I'd use "likely" here but I definitely think the >> IETF should be somewhat more thoughtful about "possible." >> >> I've been trying to figure out if there's a way forward that >> doesn't involve bulldozing the dissenters. Personally, I'd be fine >> with publishing it as informational or experimental, or if the >> document provided a lot more clarity about the basis for review >> (along the lines of 3552). >> >> Melinda >> > >