So what occurs to me is that a reasonable question to ask is whether
there are some legitimate success stories where a DISCUSS has actually
found big or reasonably big problems with a protocol that would have
wreaked havoc had they not been caught. I ask because it seems to me
that the main things that wreak havoc with protocols tend to be rather
subtle and not likely to be very visible to someone whose sum experience
with the work is their assignment to read the current draft. That's not a
slap at the people whose job is to review, only that it seems to me to
be asking for super-human abilities.
From my limited experience with DISCUSS -- and last call for
that matter -- is that the focus is far more geared toward wordsmithing
than actual mechanics of the protocol (from relatively disinterested
parties, that is). While I have no issue with tightening up drafts for
publication, it doesn't seem reasonable to be holding up the works
for endless amounts of time _just_ because somebody -- or some
faction of bodies -- isn't convinced that a draft is the prose they
deign worthy.
The other thing that occurs to me -- and I know this has been brought
up in many different forms -- is that if an AD _was_ following the
working group to some degree, why is it legitimate for them to wait
for IESG evaluation to voice comments that affect the protocol's
operation? That is, why aren't they held just like anybody else to voice
those in WG last call when the WG is far more responsive to dealing
with issues? These "IESG Surprises" really hurt the community by
leading to the general perception that the IESG is capricious in a
royally anointed kind of way.
Mike
Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
More recalls?
How many have we had?
I looked into what it would take to engage the recall process. I don't think it is possible to use it without tearing the whole organization appart.
With reference to John's recent campaigns I note that we still have a situation where IETF practice is to employ a two stage standards process but the process documents describe a mythical three stage process.
The IESG appears to be unwilling to either change the process document to reflect reality or to begin applying the three stage process. And I don't even have visibility into the process to know which individuals are the holdouts. The only response I am ever going to get back is the passive voice 'people on the IESG were not happy with the proposal'.
This is a real business issue for me, not a theoretical one. I spend too much time having to counter FUD claims that some IETF protocol or other is 'merely' draft and that it should not therefore be considered. People in the Internet area understand the mendacity but this is not the case in banking. I can explain the fact that according to the IETF HTTP 1.1 is still a draft standard but in doing so I have to conceed the fact that the IETF processes are broken at which point the proprietary FUD peddled chips in.
There are cases where consensus does not work. This is one of them. There is clearly no consensus in the IESG to either follow the process document or to fix it to match current practice. So we have the organization stuck in a decade long deadlock.
This is where you need to have leadership (another thing that the NOMCON process is expressly designed to exclude).
-----Original Message-----
From: John C Klensin [mailto:john-ietf@xxxxxxx]
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2006 8:57 AM
To: dcrocker@xxxxxxxx; sob@xxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: ietf@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: "Discuss" criteria
Dave, Scott,
At the risk of repeating what a few others have said in
different form, a few observations. Please understand that
these comments come from someone who has been more
consistently and loudly critical about even a hint of IESG
arrogance and assertions of their power than either of you
and who has formally proposed a significant number of ways of
dealing with those problems --real or imagined-- than, I
think, anyone else in the community... none of which
proposals have gone anywhere.
I believe that, ultimately, the IETF has to pick IESG members
who can do the job of evaluating documents and consensus
about it and then let them to do that job. And we had better
pick people to do that job who technical judgment and good
sense we trust. If we can't do that, then we are in
big-time, serious,
trouble: trouble from which no set of rules or procedures can
rescue us. Much as it makes me anxious, I think we ultimately
need to let an AD raise a Discuss because he or she has a bad
feeling in his or her gut... and pick people who will use
that particular reason with considerable care and who will
challenge each other and work to understand the objection and
either better document it or remove it as appropriate.
If that discussion is abused in particular cases, I think it
means that we need more appeals and, if there is a pattern, more
recalls. In a long-term tradition of the IETF that we seem to
be losing, we may also need more specific, focused, public
abuse (in plenaries and otherwise) from the community, not just from
regular complainers and microphone-hogs. What we don't need is
more rigid rules that either try to anticipate every
circumstance or that give too strong a presumption to the
wisdom of a too-homogeneous WG, especially at a time when
fewer and fewer documents seem to be getting widespread
community review during Last Call.
In that context, I can only applaud this document, not as a
set of rules that the IESG has to follow, but as one that
informs the community about the mechanisms the IESG is using.
Information is good. And, if the IESG discovers that it
needs to update that information every time its membership
changes (or every time they discover something isn't working
and make an adjustment according), I'd consider that a sign
of good health:
at least it would show that, at least in this area,
historical rules and behavior patterns are not constraining
current thinking to the extent that replacing IESG members
doesn't bring about change.
At the risk of giving a sales pitch, my other proposals have
been intended to reinforce the model above: I think it is
always going to be hard, in our community, to find IESG
members who are good at doing these kinds of technical
evaluations and sensitive to the issues involved and who are
also outstanding managers, cat-herders, bureaucrats, finance
experts, and experts on
organizational behavior. So I have sought to separate some of
those roles. I think that long terms on the IESG tend to
breed detachment from the community and a tendency to put
IESG judgment ahead of that of the community and I don't
think we can solve that with more rules about IESG behavior.
So I have sought to give Nomcoms guidance about terms, to
change the nomination/appointment model, and to make the
recall mechanism
more effective in practice. And I have sought ways to simplify
the job and reduce the workload in the hope that we can go
back to treating a term or two on the IESG as an obligation
that the right sorts of people owe the community, rather than
a position to be sought and in the more general hope of
broadening the pool of people who are willing to serve.
The fact that my proposals for change have not been
instituted tells me that the community does not see a serious
problem and doesn't believe that changes are needed. While I
believe that the lack of acceptance of changes has been IESG
recalcitrance and efforts to protect the authority and ways
of working with they are familiar and comfortable, I don't
think that changes the conclusion: the community has ways,
however unpleasant, for imposing changes that have community
consensus but that it IESG doesn't like and has chosen to not
use them. I disagree, but I think the consensus-in-practice
is fairly clear and I have to accept that.
To me, it is in the areas of adjusting IESG scope,
responsiveness, and membership that we need to do our tuning,
not by trying to restrict the IESG to particular ways of
doing its technical evaluations or the statements ADs can
make about specifications submitted for approval and
especially what arguments an AD can use for forcing the rest
of the IESG to take a harder look and initiate an in-depth
discussion (internally and, if appropriate, with the
community). More hard rules about how the IESG does its
technical evaluation work won't, IMO, help us in the common,
ordinary, cases and, when an exceptional one arrives, such
rules are likely to force the IESG into making the wrong
decisions and doing the wrong things and thereby hurt the
IETF and the Internet.
john
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