On Tue, Aug 30, 2005 at 12:29:37PM -0400, Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> Other than a few minor issues that are being dealt with in a -43
> update, I don't think that anyone has raised a blocking technical
> issue with the LLMNR specification during this IETF LC. If you (or
I did not follow the development of the LLMNR drafts; but the
discussion on this list inspired me to review the latest (-43)
Internet Draft. Having reviewed it, I do not think it should be
published as a Proposed Standard.
My greatest concern is that the document as it stands is likely to
cause a large number of bogus DNS queries. If the protocol is widely
adopted, it seems probable that many clients will have LLMNR enabled
on an interface in a situation where a DNS server has been configured
(as described in section 2). In that case, every LLMNR query will
entail (possibly more than) one DNS query, because of the provision,
"All attempts to resolve the name via DNS on all interfaces have
failed after exhausting the searchlist." Such DNS queries will become
commonplace if the protocol is widely adopted and widely used. This
feature of the design appears to increase the burden on the entire
Internet infrastructure in order to support unshared infrastructure.
My second worry is that, because the behaviour changes depending on
the results from the DNS query, this protocol will sometimes, if not
often, violate the principle of least surprise. It also opens a
whole new model for "phishing" attacks, particularly in the context
of ubiquitous wireless access points.
Because of the foregoing, I do not believe LLMNR, in its current
form, should be adopted as a Proposed Standard.
Regards,
Andrew Sullivan
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