Re: Firefox "Looking Glass" fiasco

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On Mon, 18 Dec 2017, Chris Adams wrote:

> the requires downloads to be useful.  I think simply requiring Mozilla
> to change their policies is unacceptable, as this still depends on a
> third party to properly enforce such policies (and not have any security
> issue that could result in untrusted addons being installed).
> 
> IMHO such behavior needs to be disabled by default in any packages
> shipped by Fedora for Fedora to remain a trustworthy distribution.

'Electrolysis' was a Mozilla.org codeword for a sub-project 
enabling in an A:B sample, 'telemetry' -- that is keystroke 
logging, click monitoring, timing, and more, largely without 
prominent external notice.

I had a performance issue related to inter-tab communication 
in a restrictive environment I run Firefox in, along with 
SElinux denials, and spent some time 'running down' several 
problems, in the early summer

see:

https://support.ant.com/hc/en-us/articles/115000513446-Firefox-51-Multi-Process

see my bug: 
	https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1473754
        upstream as well
                
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1383141
        closed into:
                
	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376559



	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1129492

because SysV shared memory follows Unix's “same uid policy” 
and can't be restricted/brokered like file access.  (It was 
observed when the initial attempt at a desktop content system 
call whitelist was made, but that was long enough ago that 
there could have been significant changes to how graphics work 
that might make this not a problem, so this should be 
double-checked.)  There's a not-well-specified revision to use 
memory-mapped files 
(http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/15082/) but I don't 
know what would need to happen to make it work — Ubuntu 14.04 
has a new enough X server and should (I think?) have new 
enough libraries, but X clients still empirically use SysV 
(including the Firefox parent process).


see also this:

	https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/42320.html

which implies a shm IPC privacy approach exists, but is not 
implemented.  It ignores adding SELinux constexts, and so the 
unhopeful conculsion he draws may have been overtaken by 
events


	https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1188290#c1

There was a related SELinux / no '--no-xshm IPC' filing 
upstream as well, which I cannot lay hands upon atm.  It looks 
like others have noticed the 100 pct usage, and IPC problems 
as well

	https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1471149


One had to notice such exfiltration of data, and go looking 
for how to turn it off.  I did by watching squid logs of 
queries, seeing expected domains, and then going looking.  

Adding a
	prefs.js

with

//
browser.tabs.remote.autostart = false  
browser.tabs.remote.autostart.2 = false
//
// ... above silently set itself true again  2017 08 29
//      52.2.0 (64-bit) ESR
//      Centos 7, 2017 09 update is: 52.3.0 (64-bit)

was supposed to work, but it turned out that some process 
inside FF was able to over-ride and un-restrict such even when 
explicitly turned on.  I had to change ownershop of the 
configuration file to root.root from userid.blah to stop that 
nonesense


I start ff inside a 'ssh to a unpriv'd uid' localhost X  
forwarding tunnel -- it breaks sound and video, but ... *
shrug *   I'd rather not have data I care about being
exfiltrated


I believe Jan Horak inside RH does something similar

	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1129492

'it looks like the Firefox over ssh is not used by masses'


-- Russ herrold

===============================

PEFF -- Privacy Enhanced Firefox invocation 
 ... privacy enhanced, isolated userid firefox invocation 
 
startup PATH: 
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/home/herrold/bin
reduced path PATH: 
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/home/herrold/bin
current id: uid=500(herrold) gid=500(herrold) 
groups=500(herrold),10(wheel),135(mock),498(pulse-access) 
context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
PEFF: ghola
note: ghola is a non-priv'd user on localhost, [H/T: Frank 
Herbert] 
      which we access via a keyed SSH connection 
      to try to avoid some content exfiltration by 
      hostile web browser applications: Firefox, Flash, etc 
THISHOST: centos-7.first.owlriver.net
start: Mon Dec 18 09:45:31 EST 2017
Command: ssh -X  -4   -l ghola centos-7.first.owlriver.net  
export ` dbus-launch ` ;   firefox  --no-remote   --  
 
now down in the limited, privacy enhanced firefox userid 
reduced path PATH: 
PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/home/ghola/bin
current id: uid=606(ghola) gid=606(ghola) 
groups=606(ghola),498(pulse-access) 
context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
Command: umask 022 ; /usr/bin/firefox  --no-remote   --  
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