On 05/31/2012 02:52 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: > On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 05/31/2012 02:17 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:08 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 05/31/2012 01:57 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:48 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:42 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:34 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:22 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:19 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:10 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Could be any of a thousand ways to implement this. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe it checks the BIOS to determine whether some SecureBoot flag is set. >>>>>>>>>>>>> While it pains me to argue with someone on my side— you're incorrect. >>>>>>>>>>>>> The compromised system would just intercept and emulate or patch out that test. >>>>>>>>>>>> Then what's missing here is a way for booted OS's to test themselves for integrity. >>>>>>>>>>> Maybe some sort of cryptographic signature stored in the hardware? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> <ducks> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -J >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> </sarcasm> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just not dictated by one monopoly. >>>>>>>>> Ideally, no. But you see the problem. I'm divided on the solution >>>>>>>>> myself, but I've yet to see one I feel better about. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -J >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This game of cat and mouse with the blackhats is not going to end until we have some type of read-only partitions where >>>>>>>> known good code resides. >>>>>>> We have that, ISO9660. Known good == known good to whom? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Nah, can't be iso. >>>>>> >>>>>> Has to be HDD partitions whose ro/rw state is controlled by hardware. >>>>> Which brings us back to the issue of how the hardware knows what to >>>>> trust for that ro/rw state. >>>> The hardware is under control of the user. >>>> >>>> At some point the user has to know what they consider trusted. >>>> >>>> During installation from a known good installation source: DVD, network, whatever, the user enables the install to write >>>> on the partition by actively pressing a hardware button that allows the write. After the installation is finished the >>>> user switches it back to read-only through pressing the hardware button. >>>> >>>> The user now has a known good read-only installation to boot from. >>> Is there an implementation of this existing today for HDD? >> Not yet. But HDD technology is changing rapidly. Just look at hybrid drives, SSD. >> >> No reason they could not add this capability. > Right. But it's not there now, which is my point. Actually it seems the forensic firms have been doing this for a while: http://www.digitalintelligence.com/forensicwriteblockers.php Their interfaces toggle the write wire to the drive. > >>> Because >>> otherwise with existing technology, AFAIK, that limits your media >>> choices for root fs medium to CD/DVD-R, Floppy, Zip/Jaz disc, or some >>> models of USB flash drive. >> Yes, all these would currently support what I'm suggesting. > Actually, if you're willing to flip a lot of switches, you could > probably make your / a raid5 of floppies, but the performance would be > suboptimal. > > -J > Ok, now you're just being silly. . -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
