On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:21 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 05/31/2012 02:17 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:08 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On 05/31/2012 01:57 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:48 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:42 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:34 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:22 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:19 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:10 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Could be any of a thousand ways to implement this. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe it checks the BIOS to determine whether some SecureBoot flag is set. >>>>>>>>>>>> While it pains me to argue with someone on my side— you're incorrect. >>>>>>>>>>>> The compromised system would just intercept and emulate or patch out that test. >>>>>>>>>>> Then what's missing here is a way for booted OS's to test themselves for integrity. >>>>>>>>>> Maybe some sort of cryptographic signature stored in the hardware? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> <ducks> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -J >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> </sarcasm> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just not dictated by one monopoly. >>>>>>>> Ideally, no. But you see the problem. I'm divided on the solution >>>>>>>> myself, but I've yet to see one I feel better about. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -J >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> This game of cat and mouse with the blackhats is not going to end until we have some type of read-only partitions where >>>>>>> known good code resides. >>>>>> We have that, ISO9660. Known good == known good to whom? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Nah, can't be iso. >>>>> >>>>> Has to be HDD partitions whose ro/rw state is controlled by hardware. >>>> Which brings us back to the issue of how the hardware knows what to >>>> trust for that ro/rw state. >>> The hardware is under control of the user. >>> >>> At some point the user has to know what they consider trusted. >>> >>> During installation from a known good installation source: DVD, network, whatever, the user enables the install to write >>> on the partition by actively pressing a hardware button that allows the write. After the installation is finished the >>> user switches it back to read-only through pressing the hardware button. >>> >>> The user now has a known good read-only installation to boot from. >> Is there an implementation of this existing today for HDD? > Not yet. But HDD technology is changing rapidly. Just look at hybrid drives, SSD. > > No reason they could not add this capability. Right. But it's not there now, which is my point. > >> Because >> otherwise with existing technology, AFAIK, that limits your media >> choices for root fs medium to CD/DVD-R, Floppy, Zip/Jaz disc, or some >> models of USB flash drive. > Yes, all these would currently support what I'm suggesting. Actually, if you're willing to flip a lot of switches, you could probably make your / a raid5 of floppies, but the performance would be suboptimal. -J > >> >> Some of these would work better than others. :) >> >> -J >> >> > > -- > devel mailing list > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel -- http://cecinestpasunefromage.wordpress.com/ ------------------------------------------------ in your fear, seek only peace in your fear, seek only love -d. bowie -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
