On 05/31/2012 01:48 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: > On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:42 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 05/31/2012 01:34 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:22 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 05/31/2012 01:19 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote: >>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:10 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: >>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Gerry Reno <greno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>>>> Could be any of a thousand ways to implement this. >>>>>>>> Maybe it checks the BIOS to determine whether some SecureBoot flag is set. >>>>>>> While it pains me to argue with someone on my side— you're incorrect. >>>>>>> The compromised system would just intercept and emulate or patch out that test. >>>>>> Then what's missing here is a way for booted OS's to test themselves for integrity. >>>>> Maybe some sort of cryptographic signature stored in the hardware? >>>>> >>>>> <ducks> >>>>> >>>>> -J >>>>> >>>>> </sarcasm> >>>>> >>>> Just not dictated by one monopoly. >>> Ideally, no. But you see the problem. I'm divided on the solution >>> myself, but I've yet to see one I feel better about. >>> >>> -J >>> >>> >> This game of cat and mouse with the blackhats is not going to end until we have some type of read-only partitions where >> known good code resides. > We have that, ISO9660. Known good == known good to whom? > > Nah, can't be iso. Has to be HDD partitions whose ro/rw state is controlled by hardware. -- devel mailing list devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
