On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels > > > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will > > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting > > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing. > > It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel > change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The > user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as > the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have > applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this > change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like > backups. > > I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping > security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense, > but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a > user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior > would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If > mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need > to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of > purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs. > That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.* > xattrs. Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the "host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest" uses. Thanks, Andreas
