On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing. It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like backups. I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense, but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs. That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.* xattrs. Thanks, Andreas
