Well, we could also look at supporting trusted.* xattrs over NFS. I don't know much about them, but it looks like it wouldn't be a lot of work to specify, especially now that we've already got user xattrs? We'd just write a new internet draft that refers to the existing user.* xattr draft for most of the details. --b. On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 2:56 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 3, 2021 at 8:31 AM Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 2, 2021 at 5:47 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > xfstests: generic/062: Do not run on newer kernels > > > > > > This test has been written with assumption that setting user.* xattrs will > > > fail on symlink and special files. When newer kernels support setting > > > user.* xattrs on symlink and special files, this test starts failing. > > > > It's actually a good thing that this test case triggers for the kernel > > change you're proposing; that change should never be merged. The > > user.* namespace is meant for data with the same access permissions as > > the file data, and it has been for many years. We may have > > applications that assume the existing behavior. In addition, this > > change would create backwards compatibility problems for things like > > backups. > > > > I'm not convinced that what you're actually proposing (mapping > > security.selinux to a different attribute name) actually makes sense, > > but that's a question for the selinux folks to decide. Mapping it to a > > user.* attribute is definitely wrong though. The modified behavior > > would affect anybody, not only users of selinux and/or virtiofs. If > > mapping attribute names is actually the right approach, then you need > > to look at trusted.* xattrs, which exist specifically for this kind of > > purpose. You've noted that trusted.* xattrs aren't supported over nfs. > > That's unfortunate, but not an acceptable excuse for messing up user.* > > xattrs. > > Another possibility would be to make selinux use a different > security.* attribute for this nested selinux case. That way, the > "host" selinux would retain some control over the labels the "guest" > uses. > > Thanks, > Andreas >
