Re: [PATCH 2/2 v4] SELinux: per-command whitelisting of ioctls

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On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Ok, I have finished a revision that addresses your comments (will
> email out shortly). You'll be happy to hear that I am using "extended
> permissions" instead of "operations."
>
> I tried to focus on:
>
> -Creating a stable binary policy format that will work for ioctls and
> netlink (and others) such that the policy version XPERMS_IOCTL will
> remain valid if/when version XPERMS_NETLINK is added

Great, thank you.  I realize we may need to change it when we get
there, but I appreciate the effort.

> -Keeping the current version simple, don’t partially add logic for
> selecting between ioctl/netlink in the AVC. I originally started
> adding additional components to the avc structures, but a few
> questions came up that Stephen and I did not know the answer to. It
> makes sense to punt these decisions to if/when the netlink extended
> permissions capability is actually added (saves memory in the
> meantime). The internals can change as long as the binary policy is
> stable.

That sounds fine to me.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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