On 06/03/2015 03:41 PM, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
> Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
> provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
> generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
> per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
> permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:
>
> allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
> auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds
>
> Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
> representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.
>
> When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
> This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
> permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
> may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
> driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
> as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
> access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
> to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
> to the subset of commands required.
>
> The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
> commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
> POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
> change.
>
> The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
> components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
>
> Bug: 19416735
> Change-Id: Ibd462f12ba5748cf5dd91f28e5795764363121a2
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by; Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> Version 5 changes:
>
> The policy binary format changes slightly. The avtab_operations structure
> is now the avtab_extended_perms structure. This structure now contains
> a specified variable that is used as an extenstion to the
> avtab_key.specified. Currently only used for ioctls, more values may be
> specified to use extended_perms for netfilter etc.
>
> In the avc, operations structures are likewise renamed extended_perms.
> Adding support for netfilter is outside the scope of this patch.
>
>
> security/selinux/avc.c | 415 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 42 +++-
> security/selinux/include/avc.h | 6 +
> security/selinux/include/security.h | 32 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 104 +++++++--
> security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 33 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 32 ++-
> security/selinux/ss/conditional.h | 6 +-
> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +
> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++--
> security/selinux/ss/services.h | 6 +
> 11 files changed, 834 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index 3c17dda..2d5e1b0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/skbuff.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> #include <net/sock.h>
> #include <linux/un.h>
> #include <net/af_unix.h>
> @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct avc_entry {
> u32 tsid;
> u16 tclass;
> struct av_decision avd;
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
> };
>
> struct avc_node {
> @@ -56,6 +58,16 @@ struct avc_node {
> struct rcu_head rhead;
> };
>
> +struct avc_xperms_decision_node {
> + struct extended_perms_decision xpd;
> + struct list_head xpd_list; /* list of extended_perms_decision */
> +};
> +
> +struct avc_xperms_node {
> + struct extended_perms xp;
> + struct list_head xpd_head; /* list head of extended_perms_decision */
> +};
> +
> struct avc_cache {
> struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
> spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
> @@ -80,6 +92,9 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
> static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
> static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
> static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep;
>
> static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
> {
> @@ -170,7 +185,17 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
> atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
>
> avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
> - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
> + sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
> + "avc_xperms_decision_node",
> + sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
> + sizeof(struct extended_perms_data),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>
> audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
> }
> @@ -205,9 +230,261 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
> slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * using a linked list for extended_perms_decision lookup because the list is
> + * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
> + */
> +static struct extended_perms_decision *avc_xperms_decision_lookup(u8 driver,
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(xpd_node, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
> + if (xpd_node->xpd.driver == driver)
> + return &xpd_node->xpd;
> + }
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static inline unsigned int
> +avc_xperms_has_perm(struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
> + u8 perm, u8 which)
> +{
> + unsigned int rc = 0;
> +
> + if ((which == XPERMS_ALLOWED) &&
> + (xpd->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED))
> + rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
> + else if ((which == XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) &&
> + (xpd->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
> + rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->auditallow->p, perm);
> + else if ((which == XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) &&
> + (xpd->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
> + rc = security_xperm_test(xpd->dontaudit->p, perm);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_xperms_allow_perm(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node,
> + u8 driver, u8 perm)
> +{
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
> + security_xperm_set(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver);
> + xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
> + if (xpd && xpd->allowed)
> + security_xperm_set(xpd->allowed->p, perm);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_xperms_decision_free(struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node)
> +{
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
> +
> + xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
> + if (xpd->allowed)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->allowed);
> + if (xpd->auditallow)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->auditallow);
> + if (xpd->dontaudit)
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_data_cachep, xpd->dontaudit);
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, xpd_node);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_xperms_free(struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node, *tmp;
> +
> + if (!xp_node)
> + return;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry_safe(xpd_node, tmp, &xp_node->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
> + list_del(&xpd_node->xpd_list);
> + avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
> + }
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_xperms_cachep, xp_node);
> +}
> +
> +static void avc_copy_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *src)
> +{
> + dest->driver = src->driver;
> + dest->used = src->used;
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
> + memcpy(dest->allowed->p, src->allowed->p,
> + sizeof(src->allowed->p));
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
> + memcpy(dest->auditallow->p, src->auditallow->p,
> + sizeof(src->auditallow->p));
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
> + memcpy(dest->dontaudit->p, src->dontaudit->p,
> + sizeof(src->dontaudit->p));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * similar to avc_copy_xperms_decision, but only copy decision
> + * information relevant to this perm
> + */
> +static inline void avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(u8 perm,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *dest,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *src)
> +{
> + /*
> + * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
> + * command permission
> + */
> + u8 i = perm >> 5;
> +
> + dest->used = src->used;
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_ALLOWED)
> + dest->allowed->p[i] = src->allowed->p[i];
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)
> + dest->auditallow->p[i] = src->auditallow->p[i];
> + if (dest->used & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
> + dest->dontaudit->p[i] = src->dontaudit->p[i];
> +}
> +
> +static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
> + *avc_xperms_decision_alloc(u8 which)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
> +
> + xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!xpd_node)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
> + if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
> + xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!xpd->allowed)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
> + xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!xpd->auditallow)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
> + xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!xpd->dontaudit)
> + goto error;
> + }
> + return xpd_node;
> +error:
> + avc_xperms_decision_free(xpd_node);
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static int avc_add_xperms_decision(struct avc_node *node,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *src)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
> +
> + node->ae.xp_node->xp.len++;
> + dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src->used);
> + if (!dest_xpd)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, src);
> + list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &node->ae.xp_node->xpd_head);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
> +
> + xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
> + GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
> + if (!xp_node)
> + return xp_node;
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
> + return xp_node;
> +}
> +
> +static int avc_xperms_populate(struct avc_node *node,
> + struct avc_xperms_node *src)
> +{
> + struct avc_xperms_node *dest;
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *dest_xpd;
> + struct avc_xperms_decision_node *src_xpd;
> +
> + if (src->xp.len == 0)
> + return 0;
> + dest = avc_xperms_alloc();
> + if (!dest)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + memcpy(dest->xp.drivers.p, src->xp.drivers.p, sizeof(dest->xp.drivers.p));
> + dest->xp.len = src->xp.len;
> +
> + /* for each source xpd allocate a destination xpd and copy */
> + list_for_each_entry(src_xpd, &src->xpd_head, xpd_list) {
> + dest_xpd = avc_xperms_decision_alloc(src_xpd->xpd.used);
> + if (!dest_xpd)
> + goto error;
> + avc_copy_xperms_decision(&dest_xpd->xpd, &src_xpd->xpd);
> + list_add(&dest_xpd->xpd_list, &dest->xpd_head);
> + }
> + node->ae.xp_node = dest;
> + return 0;
> +error:
> + avc_xperms_free(dest);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
> + u8 perm,
> + int result,
> + u32 *deniedp)
> +{
> + u32 denied, audited;
> +
> + denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
> + if (unlikely(denied)) {
> + audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
> + if (audited && xpd) {
> + if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT))
> + audited &= ~requested;
> + }
> + } else if (result) {
> + audited = denied = requested;
> + } else {
> + audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
> + if (audited && xpd) {
> + if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW))
> + audited &= ~requested;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + *deniedp = denied;
> + return audited;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
> + u8 perm, int result,
> + struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> + u32 audited, denied;
> +
> + audited = avc_xperms_audit_required(
> + requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
> + if (likely(!audited))
> + return 0;
> + return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
> + audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
> +}
> +
> static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
> {
> struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
> + avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
> kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
> }
> @@ -221,6 +498,7 @@ static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
>
> static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
> {
> + avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
> kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
> atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
> @@ -367,6 +645,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
> * @tsid: target security identifier
> * @tclass: target security class
> * @avd: resulting av decision
> + * @xp_node: resulting extended permissions
> *
> * Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
> * (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
> @@ -378,7 +657,9 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
> * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
> * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
> */
> -static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
> +static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
> {
> struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
> int hvalue;
> @@ -391,10 +672,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_dec
> if (node) {
> struct hlist_head *head;
> spinlock_t *lock;
> + int rc = 0;
>
> hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> -
> + rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, xp_node);
> + if (rc) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
> lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
>
> @@ -523,14 +809,17 @@ out:
> * @perms : Permission mask bits
> * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
> * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
> + * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
> *
> * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
> * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
> * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
> * will release later by RCU.
> */
> -static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> - u32 seqno)
> +static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
> + u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
> + u32 flags)
> {
> int hvalue, rc = 0;
> unsigned long flag;
> @@ -574,9 +863,19 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
>
> avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
>
> + if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
> + rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
> + if (rc) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> + }
> +
> switch (event) {
> case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
> node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
> + if (node->ae.xp_node && (flags & AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS))
> + avc_xperms_allow_perm(node->ae.xp_node, driver, xperm);
> break;
> case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
> case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
> @@ -594,6 +893,9 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
> node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
> break;
> + case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS:
> + avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
> + break;
> }
> avc_node_replace(node, orig);
> out_unlock:
> @@ -665,18 +967,20 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
> * results in a bigger stack frame.
> */
> static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
> + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
> {
> rcu_read_unlock();
> - security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
> + security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
> rcu_read_lock();
> - return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
> }
>
> static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> - unsigned flags,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
> + struct av_decision *avd)
> {
> if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
> return -EACCES;
> @@ -684,11 +988,91 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
> return -EACCES;
>
> - avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
> - tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
> + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
> + tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
> return 0;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * The avc extended permissions logic adds an additional 256 bits of
> + * permissions to an avc node when extended permissions for that node are
> + * specified in the avtab. If the additional 256 permissions is not adequate,
> + * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
> + * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
> + */
> +int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> + struct avc_node *node;
> + struct av_decision avd;
> + u32 denied;
> + struct extended_perms_decision local_xpd;
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpd = NULL;
> + struct extended_perms_data allowed;
> + struct extended_perms_data auditallow;
> + struct extended_perms_data dontaudit;
> + struct avc_xperms_node local_xp_node;
> + struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
> + int rc = 0, rc2;
> +
> + xp_node = &local_xp_node;
> + BUG_ON(!requested);
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> +
> + node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> + if (unlikely(!node)) {
> + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
> + } else {
> + memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
> + xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
> + }
> + /* if extended permissions are not defined, only consider av_decision */
> + if (!xp_node || !xp_node->xp.len)
> + goto decision;
> +
> + local_xpd.allowed = &allowed;
> + local_xpd.auditallow = &auditallow;
> + local_xpd.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
> +
> + xpd = avc_xperms_decision_lookup(driver, xp_node);
> + if (unlikely(!xpd)) {
> + /*
> + * Compute the extended_perms_decision only if the driver
> + * is flagged
> + */
> + if (!security_xperm_test(xp_node->xp.drivers.p, driver)) {
> + avd.allowed &= ~requested;
> + goto decision;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
> + &local_xpd);
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
> + ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
> + } else {
> + avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
> + }
> + xpd = &local_xpd;
> +
> + if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, xperm, XPERMS_ALLOWED))
> + avd.allowed &= ~requested;
> +
> +decision:
> + denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
> + if (unlikely(denied))
> + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
> + AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
> +
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
> + &avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
> + if (rc2)
> + return rc2;
> + return rc;
> +}
>
> /**
> * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
> @@ -716,6 +1100,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> struct av_decision *avd)
> {
> struct avc_node *node;
> + struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
> int rc = 0;
> u32 denied;
>
> @@ -725,13 +1110,13 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
>
> node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
> if (unlikely(!node))
> - node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
> + node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
> else
> memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
>
> denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
> if (unlikely(denied))
> - rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
> + rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
>
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return rc;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 2c616f6..d89b1fb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3252,6 +3252,46 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
> file_free_security(file);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
> + * operation to an inode.
> + */
> +int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
> + u32 requested, u16 cmd)
> +{
> + struct common_audit_data ad;
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> + struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
> + u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
> + int rc;
> + u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
> + u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
> +
> + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
> + ad.u.op = &ioctl;
> + ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
> + ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
> +
> + if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
> + rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
> + SECCLASS_FD,
> + FD__USE,
> + &ad);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
> + requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
> +out:
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> unsigned long arg)
> {
> @@ -3294,7 +3334,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
> * to the file's ioctl() function.
> */
> default:
> - error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
> + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
> }
> return error;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> index ddf8eec..db12ff1 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
> @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> }
>
> #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
> +#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */
> int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> unsigned flags,
> @@ -151,6 +152,10 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
>
> +int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
> +
> +
> u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
>
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
> @@ -161,6 +166,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
> #define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
> +#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS 256
>
> int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> index 36993ad..6a681d2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> @@ -35,13 +35,14 @@
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30
>
> /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
> #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
> #else
> -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
> +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
> #endif
>
> /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
> @@ -109,11 +110,38 @@ struct av_decision {
> u32 flags;
> };
>
> +#define XPERMS_ALLOWED 1
> +#define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2
> +#define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4
> +
> +#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
> +#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
> +struct extended_perms_data {
> + u32 p[8];
> +};
> +
> +struct extended_perms_decision {
> + u8 used;
> + u8 driver;
> + struct extended_perms_data *allowed;
> + struct extended_perms_data *auditallow;
> + struct extended_perms_data *dontaudit;
> +};
> +
> +struct extended_perms {
> + u16 len; /* length associated decision chain */
> + struct extended_perms_data drivers; /* flag drivers that are used */
> +};
> +
> /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
> #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
>
> void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> - u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
> + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms *xperms);
> +
> +void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
> + u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
>
> void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
> u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> index b64f277..3628d3a 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include "policydb.h"
>
> static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
> +static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
>
> /* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
> * public domain.
> @@ -70,11 +71,24 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
> struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
> {
> struct avtab_node *newnode;
> + struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
> newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (newnode == NULL)
> return NULL;
> newnode->key = *key;
> - newnode->datum = *datum;
> +
> + if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> + xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (xperms == NULL) {
> + kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> + *xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
> + newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
> + } else {
> + newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
> + }
> +
> if (prev) {
> newnode->next = prev->next;
> prev->next = newnode;
> @@ -107,8 +121,12 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
> if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
> key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
> key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
> - (specified & cur->key.specified))
> + (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
> + /* extended perms may not be unique */
> + if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
> + break;
> return -EEXIST;
> + }
> if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
> break;
> if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
> @@ -271,6 +289,9 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
> while (cur) {
> temp = cur;
> cur = cur->next;
> + if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
> + kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
> + temp->datum.u.xperms);
> kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
> }
> }
> @@ -359,7 +380,10 @@ static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
> AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
> AVTAB_TRANSITION,
> AVTAB_CHANGE,
> - AVTAB_MEMBER
> + AVTAB_MEMBER,
> + AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
> + AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
> + AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
> };
>
> int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> @@ -369,10 +393,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> {
> __le16 buf16[4];
> u16 enabled;
> - __le32 buf32[7];
> u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
> struct avtab_key key;
> struct avtab_datum datum;
> + struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
> + __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
> int i, rc;
> unsigned set;
>
> @@ -429,11 +454,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> + if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
>
> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
> if (val & spec_order[i]) {
> key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
> - datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
> + datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
> rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> @@ -476,14 +505,42 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> - rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
> - if (rc) {
> - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> - return rc;
> + if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
> + (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
> + "support extended permissions rules and one "
> + "was specified\n", vers);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + } else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> + memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
> + rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
> + xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
> + datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
> + } else {
> + rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
> + if (rc) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
> + return rc;
> + }
> + datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
> }
> - datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
> if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
> - !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
> + !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
> printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> @@ -543,8 +600,9 @@ bad:
> int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
> {
> __le16 buf16[4];
> - __le32 buf32[1];
> + __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
> int rc;
> + unsigned int i;
>
> buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
> buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
> @@ -553,8 +611,22 @@ int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
> rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> - buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
> - rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
> +
> + if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
> + rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
> + buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
> + rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
> + ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
> + } else {
> + buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
> + rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
> + }
> if (rc)
> return rc;
> return 0;
> @@ -588,9 +660,13 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
> avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
> sizeof(struct avtab_node),
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> + avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
> + sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
> + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> }
>
> void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
> {
> kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
> + kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> index adb451c..d946c9d 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> #ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
> #define _SS_AVTAB_H_
>
> +#include "security.h"
> #include <linux/flex_array.h>
>
> struct avtab_key {
> @@ -37,13 +38,43 @@ struct avtab_key {
> #define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
> #define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
> #define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
> +/* extended permissions */
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED 0x0100
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
> + AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
> + AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
> #define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
> #define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
> u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
> };
>
> +/*
> + * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
> + * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
> + */
> +struct avtab_extended_perms {
> +/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
> +#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER 0x02
> + /* extension of the avtab_key specified */
> + u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
> + /*
> + * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
> + * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
> + * specifies which permissions are included.
> + */
> + u8 driver;
> + /* 256 bits of permissions */
> + struct extended_perms_data perms;
> +};
> +
> struct avtab_datum {
> - u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
> + union {
> + u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
> + struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
> + } u;
> };
>
> struct avtab_node {
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> index 62c6773..18643bf 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>
> #include "security.h"
> #include "conditional.h"
> +#include "services.h"
>
> /*
> * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
> @@ -612,21 +613,39 @@ int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
>
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
> +{
> + struct avtab_node *node;
> +
> + if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
> + return;
> +
> + for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
> + node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
> + services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
> + }
> + return;
> +
> +}
> /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
> * av table, and if so, add them to the result
> */
> -void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
> +void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
> {
> struct avtab_node *node;
>
> - if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
> + if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !xperms)
> return;
>
> for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
> node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> - avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
> @@ -634,10 +653,13 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decisi
> * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
> * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
> */
> - avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
> if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
> (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
> - avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
> + if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
> + (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
> + services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
> }
> return;
> }
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> index 4d1f874..ddb43e7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
> @@ -73,8 +73,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
> int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
> int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
>
> -void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
> -
> +void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
> +void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
> int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
>
> #endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> index 74aa224..992a315 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
> .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
> .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
> },
> + {
> + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
> + .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
> + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
> + },
> };
>
> static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 9e2d820..b7df12b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
> u32 *scontext_len);
>
> static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> - struct context *tcontext,
> - u16 tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd);
> + struct context *tcontext,
> + u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms *xperms);
>
> struct selinux_mapping {
> u16 value; /* policy value */
> @@ -565,7 +566,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
> tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -580,7 +582,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
> &lo_tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
> &lo_tcontext,
> tclass,
> - &lo_avd);
> + &lo_avd,
> + NULL);
> if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> return; /* no masked permission */
> masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> @@ -613,13 +617,39 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
> - * the permissions in a particular class.
> + * flag which drivers have permissions
> + * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
> + */
> +void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
> + struct extended_perms *xperms,
> + struct avtab_node *node)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
> + /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
> + xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
> + } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
> + /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
> + security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
> + node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
> + }
> +
> + /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
> + if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED)
> + xperms->len = 1;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
> + * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
> */
> static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> - struct context *tcontext,
> - u16 tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + struct context *tcontext,
> + u16 tclass,
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms *xperms)
> {
> struct constraint_node *constraint;
> struct role_allow *ra;
> @@ -633,6 +663,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> avd->allowed = 0;
> avd->auditallow = 0;
> avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
> + if (xperms) {
> + memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
> + xperms->len = 0;
> + }
>
> if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
> if (printk_ratelimit())
> @@ -647,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> * this permission check, then use it.
> */
> avkey.target_class = tclass;
> - avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
> + avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
> sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
> BUG_ON(!sattr);
> tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
> @@ -660,15 +694,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
> node;
> node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
> if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
> - avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
> else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
> - avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
> else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
> - avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
> + avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
> + else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
> + services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
> }
>
> /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
> - cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
> + cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
> + avd, xperms);
>
> }
> }
> @@ -899,6 +936,139 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
> avd->flags = 0;
> }
>
> +void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
> + struct avtab_node *node)
> +{
> + unsigned int i;
> +
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
> + if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
> + return;
> + } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
> + if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
> + xpermd->driver))
> + return;
> + } else {
> + BUG();
> + }
> +
> + if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
> + xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
> + memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
> + sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
> + }
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
> + xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
> + }
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
> + xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
> + memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
> + sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
> + }
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
> + xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
> + }
> + } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
> + xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
> + memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
> + sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
> + }
> + if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
> + xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
> + node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
> + }
> + } else {
> + BUG();
> + }
> +}
> +
> +void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
> + u32 tsid,
> + u16 orig_tclass,
> + u8 driver,
> + struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
> +{
> + u16 tclass;
> + struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
> + struct avtab_key avkey;
> + struct avtab_node *node;
> + struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
> + struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
> + unsigned int i, j;
> +
> + xpermd->driver = driver;
> + xpermd->used = 0;
> + memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
> + memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
> + memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
> +
> + read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> + if (!ss_initialized)
> + goto allow;
> +
> + scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
> + if (!scontext) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
> + __func__, ssid);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
> + if (!tcontext) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
> + __func__, tsid);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
> + if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
> + if (policydb.allow_unknown)
> + goto allow;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> +
> + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + avkey.target_class = tclass;
> + avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
> + sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
> + scontext->type - 1);
> + BUG_ON(!sattr);
> + tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
> + tcontext->type - 1);
> + BUG_ON(!tattr);
> + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
> + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
> + avkey.source_type = i + 1;
> + avkey.target_type = j + 1;
> + for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
> + node;
> + node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
> + services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
> +
> + cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
> + &avkey, xpermd);
> + }
> + }
> +out:
> + read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> + return;
> +allow:
> + memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
> + goto out;
> +}
>
> /**
> * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
> @@ -906,6 +1076,7 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
> * @tsid: target security identifier
> * @tclass: target security class
> * @avd: access vector decisions
> + * @xperms: extended permissions
> *
> * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
> * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
> @@ -913,13 +1084,15 @@ static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
> void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
> u32 tsid,
> u16 orig_tclass,
> - struct av_decision *avd)
> + struct av_decision *avd,
> + struct extended_perms *xperms)
> {
> u16 tclass;
> struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
>
> read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> avd_init(avd);
> + xperms->len = 0;
> if (!ss_initialized)
> goto allow;
>
> @@ -947,7 +1120,7 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
> goto allow;
> goto out;
> }
> - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
> + context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
> map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
> out:
> read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> @@ -993,7 +1166,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
> + context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
> out:
> read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> return;
> @@ -1515,7 +1688,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
>
> if (avdatum) {
> /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
> - newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
> + newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
> }
>
> /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> index e8d907e..6abcd87 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
> @@ -11,5 +11,11 @@
>
> extern struct policydb policydb;
>
> +void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
> + struct avtab_node *node);
> +
> +void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
> + struct avtab_node *node);
> +
> #endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
>
>
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