Re: [PATCH 2/2 v4] SELinux: per-command whitelisting of ioctls

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Thanks again Paul for taking the time to review these patches. I'm
quite excited about getting these patches into the mainline kernel,
since reducing ioctl attack surface is a big goal of Android's.

Just FYI: the original version of the patches are now shipping with
the Android M preview release
(https://developer.android.com/preview/download.html), so if you're
interested in trying it out, please do. We're doing ioctl filtering on
tcp/udp socket file descriptors, and so far we haven't seen any bugs
from this code.


On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 2:01 PM, Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Ok, I have finished a revision that addresses your comments (will
>> email out shortly). You'll be happy to hear that I am using "extended
>> permissions" instead of "operations."
>>
>> I tried to focus on:
>>
>> -Creating a stable binary policy format that will work for ioctls and
>> netlink (and others) such that the policy version XPERMS_IOCTL will
>> remain valid if/when version XPERMS_NETLINK is added
>
> Great, thank you.  I realize we may need to change it when we get
> there, but I appreciate the effort.
>
>> -Keeping the current version simple, don’t partially add logic for
>> selecting between ioctl/netlink in the AVC. I originally started
>> adding additional components to the avc structures, but a few
>> questions came up that Stephen and I did not know the answer to. It
>> makes sense to punt these decisions to if/when the netlink extended
>> permissions capability is actually added (saves memory in the
>> meantime). The internals can change as long as the binary policy is
>> stable.
>
> That sounds fine to me.
>
> --
> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com



-- 
Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@xxxxxxxxxx | 650.214.4037

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