Re: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: remove dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av()

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On Wed, 2010-01-20 at 13:25 +0900, KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> This patch removes dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av().
> 
> Due to the historical reason, the type boundary feature is delivered
> from hierarchical types in libsepol, it has supported boundary features
> both of subject type (domain; in most cases) and target type.
> 
> However, we don't have any actual use cases in bounded target types,
> and it tended to make conceptual confusion.
> So, this patch removes the dead code to apply boundary checks on the
> target types. I makes clear the TYPEBOUNDS restricts privileges of
> a certain domain bounded to any other domain.
> 
>  Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> --
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c |   36 ++----------------------------------
>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

$ make C=2 security/selinux/ss/services.o
security/selinux/ss/services.c: In function ‘type_attribute_bounds_av’:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:524: warning: unused variable ‘target’
security/selinux/ss/services.c:520: warning: unused variable ‘lo_tcontext’


> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 3b42b15..a63593e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -523,9 +523,10 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
>  		= policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
>  	struct type_datum *target
>  		= policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
> -	u32 masked = 0;
> 
>  	if (source->bounds) {
> +		u32 masked;
> +
>  		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
> 
>  		memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
> @@ -538,40 +539,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
>  		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
>  			return;		/* no masked permission */
>  		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> -	}
> -
> -	if (target->bounds) {
> -		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
> -
> -		memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
> -		lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
> -
> -		context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
> -					  &lo_tcontext,
> -					  tclass,
> -					  &lo_avd);
> -		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> -			return;		/* no masked permission */
> -		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> -	}
> -
> -	if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
> -		memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
> -		/*
> -		 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
> -		 * set up.
> -		 */
> -
> -		context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
> -					  &lo_tcontext,
> -					  tclass,
> -					  &lo_avd);
> -		if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
> -			return;		/* no masked permission */
> -		masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
> -	}
> 
> -	if (masked) {
>  		/* mask violated permissions */
>  		avd->allowed &= ~masked;
> 
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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