RE: secadm/sysadm discussion

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I would concur that something like sysadm is needed.  But in the current
mls/strict configuration sysadm has too much power. 

The ability to customize roles and there respective powers in a modular
manner seems like a good idea. Hopefully this could lead to more
directed policy instead of blanket allow rules. These are hard to deal
with when people require changes to the default behavior.

-Chad

> On Fri, 2008-02-15 at 16:22 -0500, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
> > <rant>
> > 
> > 
> > Personally I think sysadm_t is a waste of time.  It is a poor mans
> > unconfined_t and should be eliminated from the face of the earth.
All
> > it does is generate Bugs and avc messages without supplying any real
> > security.  It makes no sense, as a confinement of a root user since
it
> > is so easily gotten around.  If you have an administrator of a
machine,
> > that you want to confine, start with only allowing him the privs
that
> > are required to do his job.  You can't start by saying he can do
> > everything except ABC.
> 
> As long as policy is used in a strict configuration, sysadm will be
> needed.  I would prefer to tighten it up.
> 
> -- 
> Chris PeBenito
> Tresys Technology, LLC
> (410) 290-1411 x150
> 



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