On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 15:16 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 18:12 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > Well, in the absence of hardcoded in-kernel policy, there needs to be > > some mechanism for ensuring the integrity of a policy. Shipping a signed > > policy initramfs fragment and having any Secure Boot bootloaders pass a > > flag in bootparams indicating that the kernel should panic if that > > fragment isn't present would seem to be the easiest way of doing that. > > Or have I misunderstood the question? > > Ok, I was confused by the term "fragmented" initramfs. So once you have > verified the "early" fragmented initramfs signature, this initramfs will > load the "trusted" public keys and could also load the MAC policy. (I > realize that dracut is currently loading the MAC policy, not the > initramfs.) The MAC policy would then be trusted, right? Could we then > use the LSM labels for defining an integrity policy for kexec? Right, that'd be the rough idea. Any further runtime policy updates would presumably need to be signed with a trusted key. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx ��.n��������+%������w��{.n�����{����*jg��������ݢj����G�������j:+v���w�m������w�������h�����٥