On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Sorry, I'm not sure to which work you're referring. If you're referring
> to Dmitry's "initramfs with digital signature protection" patches, then
> we're speaking about enforcing integrity, not MAC security.
Well, in the absence of hardcoded in-kernel policy, there needs to be
some mechanism for ensuring the integrity of a policy. Shipping a signed
policy initramfs fragment and having any Secure Boot bootloaders pass a
flag in bootparams indicating that the kernel should panic if that
fragment isn't present would seem to be the easiest way of doing that.
Or have I misunderstood the question?
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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