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Re: [PATCH v3] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations, (continued)
- Re: [PATCH v3] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations, Kees Cook
  - Re: [PATCH v3] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations, Topi Miettinen
[RFC PATCH 00/13] Add futex2 syscalls, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, André Almeida
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, André Almeida
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Peter Zijlstra
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, André Almeida
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Peter Zijlstra
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Peter Zijlstra
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Peter Zijlstra
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
- [RFC PATCH 02/13] futex2: Add support for shared futexes, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait, André Almeida
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait, Zebediah Figura
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
- [RFC PATCH 04/13] futex2: Implement requeue operation, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation, André Almeida
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation, Randy Dunlap
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 08/13] selftests: futex2: Add timeout test, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 07/13] selftests: futex2: Add wake/wait test, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 05/13] futex2: Add compatibility entry point for x86_x32 ABI, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 10/13] selftests: futex2: Add waitv test, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 11/13] selftests: futex2: Add requeue test, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 12/13] perf bench: Add futex2 benchmark tests, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 09/13] selftests: futex2: Add wouldblock test, André Almeida
- [RFC PATCH 13/13] kernel: Enable waitpid() for futex2, André Almeida
RFC: ksmbd ABI for ksmbd-tools..., Stefan Metzmacher
- Re: [Linux-cifsd-devel] RFC: ksmbd ABI for ksmbd-tools..., Sergey Senozhatsky
[PATCH v7 1/3] arm64: mte: make the per-task SCTLR_EL1 field usable elsewhere, Peter Collingbourne
- [PATCH v7 2/3] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS), Peter Collingbourne
- [PATCH v7 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths, Peter Collingbourne
LINUX_VERSION_CODE overflow (was: Re: Linux 4.9.256), Florian Weimer
- Re: LINUX_VERSION_CODE overflow (was: Re: Linux 4.9.256), Greg Kroah-Hartman
Are vDSO addresses special?, Florian Weimer
- Re: Are vDSO addresses special?, Andy Lutomirski
  - Re: Are vDSO addresses special?, Florian Weimer
[PATCH v2 1/1] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, rao . shoaib
[PATCH v20 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Yu-cheng Yu
[PATCH v20 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v20 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v20 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v20 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Kees Cook
  - Re: [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Andy Lutomirski
- [PATCH v20 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Kees Cook
[PATCH bpf 0/4] Expose network namespace cookies to user space, Lorenz Bauer
- [PATCH bpf 1/4] net: add SO_NETNS_COOKIE socket option, Lorenz Bauer
  - Re: [PATCH bpf 1/4] net: add SO_NETNS_COOKIE socket option, Eric Dumazet
- [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, Lorenz Bauer
  - Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, kernel test robot
  - Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, kernel test robot
  - Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, Christian Brauner
    - Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, Lorenz Bauer
      - Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie, Christian Brauner
Re: [x86/signal] dc8df6e85d: kernel-selftests.sigaltstack.sas.fail, Bae, Chang Seok
[PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 03/10] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 04/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 06/10] arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 05/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Mike Rapoport
  - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
      - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, David Hildenbrand
    - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Mike Rapoport
  - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Matthew Garrett
    - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Mike Rapoport
      - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Matthew Garrett
      - Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, Dan Williams
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users, James Bottomley
- [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
  - Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
      - Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, James Bottomley
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, James Bottomley
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, James Bottomley
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, James Bottomley
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, James Bottomley
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
- [PATCH v17 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v17 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2), Mike Rapoport
- Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
  - Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
    - Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
      - Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, David Hildenbrand
        
        Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Michal Hocko
[RFC PATCH v3 0/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
- [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Matthew Wilcox
    - RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Matthew Wilcox
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, David Hildenbrand
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, David Hildenbrand
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, David Rientjes
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Arnd Bergmann
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Andy Lutomirski
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Greg KH
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Greg KH
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Zhou Wang
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Matthew Wilcox
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, David Hildenbrand
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Jason Gunthorpe
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Jason Gunthorpe
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Jason Gunthorpe
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Jason Gunthorpe
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin, David Hildenbrand
- [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/vm: add mempinfd test, Zhou Wang
[PATCH v2] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Petr Mladek
- Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Steven Rostedt
  - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
    - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Steven Rostedt
    - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Greg Kroah-Hartman
      - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
- Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
  - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Joe Perches
    - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
      - Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Joe Perches
        
        Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
        
        Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Joe Perches
        
        Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
        
        Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support, Chris Down
[PATCH RESEND] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
- Re: [PATCH RESEND] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD, Thomas Gleixner
[RFC][PATCH 0/2] keys: request_key() interception in containers, David Howells
- [PATCH 2/2] keys: Allow request_key upcalls from a container to be intercepted, David Howells
  - Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys: Allow request_key upcalls from a container to be intercepted, kernel test robot
- [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, David Howells
  - Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, kernel test robot
  - Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, kernel test robot
  - Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, David Howells
    - Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH v19 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Kees Cook
  - Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Borislav Petkov
    - Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu, Yu-cheng
  - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Borislav Petkov
    - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Kees Cook
      - Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Borislav Petkov
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Borislav Petkov
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Borislav Petkov
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Dave Hansen
      - Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu, Yu-cheng
    - Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Cyrill Gorcunov
    - Re: [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Kees Cook
    - Re: [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu, Yu-cheng
[PATCH v19 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v19 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Kees Cook
- [PATCH v19 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v19 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support, Kees Cook
[PATCH v5 0/5] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size, Chang S. Bae
- [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi, Chang S. Bae
  - Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi, Dave Martin
    - Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi, Will Deacon
- [PATCH v5 2/5] x86/signal: Introduce helpers to get the maximum signal frame size, Chang S. Bae
- [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/elf: Support a new ELF aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ, Chang S. Bae
- [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow, Chang S. Bae
  - Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow, Andy Lutomirski
- [PATCH v5 5/5] selftest/x86/signal: Include test cases for validating sigaltstack, Chang S. Bae
[PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Serge E. Hallyn
    - Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
      - Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Serge E. Hallyn
    - Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
      - Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Serge E. Hallyn
    - Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Casey Schaufler
    - Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Casey Schaufler
- [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Serge E. Hallyn
    - Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
[PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  - Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
    - Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
      - Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
[PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps, Andrei Vagin
- [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Andrei Vagin
  - Re: [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Will Deacon
    - Re: [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Andrei Vagin
- [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps, Andrei Vagin
  - Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps, Will Deacon
    - Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps, Dave Martin
    - Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps, Andrei Vagin
- [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Andrei Vagin
  - Re: [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Will Deacon
    - Re: [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS, Kees Cook
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps, Keno Fischer
  - Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps, Andrei Vagin
    - Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps, Keno Fischer
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps, Will Deacon
Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, Oscar Salvador
- Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Hildenbrand
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Rientjes
[PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
- Message not available
  - Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  - Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page, Suren Baghdasaryan
[PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Hildenbrand
- Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, Oscar Salvador
- Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Rientjes
  - Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Hildenbrand
    - Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Rientjes
      - Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo, David Hildenbrand
[PATCH v18 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking, Yu-cheng Yu
[PATCH v18 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v18 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Andy Lutomirski
      - Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Borislav Petkov
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu, Yu-cheng
    - Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v18 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack., Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property(), Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
  - Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
      - Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack, Yu, Yu-cheng
- [PATCH v18 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
- [PATCH v18 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack, Yu-cheng Yu
Re: [PATCH 1/8] quota: Allow to pass mount path to quotactl, Jan Kara
- Re: [PATCH 1/8] quota: Allow to pass mount path to quotactl, Christoph Hellwig
Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Michal Hocko
- Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Christian König
  - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Christian König
      - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Michal Hocko
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Jann Horn
  - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Christian König
      - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Michal Hocko
      - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Pekka Paalanen
        
        Message not available
        
        Message not available
        
        Message not available
        
        Message not available
        
        Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Daniel Vetter
  - Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds, Kalesh Singh
[PATCH v24 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
[PATCH v24 14/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display, Casey Schaufler
[RFC][PATCH 0/2] unprivileged fanotify listener, Amir Goldstein
- [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Amir Goldstein
  - Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Jan Kara
    - Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Amir Goldstein
      - Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Jan Kara
    - Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Amir Goldstein
      - Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs, Amir Goldstein
- [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
  - Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Jan Kara
    - Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
      - Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
        
        Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
        
        Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Jan Kara
        
        Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
        
        Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Amir Goldstein
        
        Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users, Jan Kara
[PATCH v10 1/2] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap(), vdso, stack and heap, Topi Miettinen
- [PATCH v10 2/2] mm/mremap: optionally randomize mremap(..., MREMAP_MAYMOVE), Topi Miettinen
[PATCH v7 13/15] btrfs: send: allocate send buffer with alloc_page() and vmap() for v2, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH v7 14/15] btrfs: send: send compressed extents with encoded writes, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH v7 15/15] btrfs: send: enable support for stream v2 and compressed writes, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH v7 12/15] btrfs: send: write larger chunks when using stream v2, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH v7 11/15] btrfs: add send stream v2 definitions, Omar Sandoval
- Re: [PATCH v7 11/15] btrfs: add send stream v2 definitions, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH v7 00/10] fs: interface for directly reading/writing compressed data, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 02/10] fs: add O_ALLOW_ENCODED open flag, Omar Sandoval
  - Re: [PATCH v7 02/10] fs: add O_ALLOW_ENCODED open flag, Josef Bacik
- [PATCH v7 03/10] fs: add RWF_ENCODED for reading/writing compressed data, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 08/10] btrfs: optionally extend i_size in cow_file_range_inline(), Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 04/10] btrfs: fix check_data_csum() error message for direct I/O, Omar Sandoval
  - Re: [PATCH v7 04/10] btrfs: fix check_data_csum() error message for direct I/O, Josef Bacik
- [PATCH v7 05/10] btrfs: don't advance offset for compressed bios in btrfs_csum_one_bio(), Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 07/10] btrfs: support different disk extent size for delalloc, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 06/10] btrfs: add ram_bytes and offset to btrfs_ordered_extent, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 10/10] btrfs: implement RWF_ENCODED writes, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 09/10] btrfs: implement RWF_ENCODED reads, Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH v7 01/10] iov_iter: add copy_struct_from_iter(), Omar Sandoval
- [PATCH man-pages v7] Document encoded I/O, Omar Sandoval
- Re: [PATCH v7 00/10] fs: interface for directly reading/writing compressed data, Josef Bacik
  - Re: [PATCH v7 00/10] fs: interface for directly reading/writing compressed data, Omar Sandoval
[PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
- Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Jakub Kicinski
  - Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
    - Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Jakub Kicinski
      - Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Jakub Kicinski
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Jakub Kicinski
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Jakub Kicinski
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Matthew Wilcox
        
        RE: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, David Laight
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
    - Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Matthew Wilcox
      - Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
        
        Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG, Shoaib Rao
Re: [PATCH] tee: Add -q, --quiet option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
- [PATCH v2] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar
  - Re: [PATCH v2] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
- [PATCH] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar
- [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar
  - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Teran McKinney
    - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
  - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Otto Moerbeek
    - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Theo de Raadt
    - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alex Henrie
      - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Otto Moerbeek
      - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Bernhard Voelker
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alex Henrie
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alex Henrie
        
        Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Alex Henrie
  - Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout, Philipp-Joachim Ost
[PATCH v27 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
    - Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  - Re: [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
- [PATCH v27 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
[PATCH v6 00/40] idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 03/40] fs: add file and path permissions helpers, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 03/40] fs: add file and path permissions helpers, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 04/40] capability: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 04/40] capability: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 10/40] commoncap: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 10/40] commoncap: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 08/40] acl: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 14/40] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 11/40] stat: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 11/40] stat: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 13/40] namei: introduce struct renamedata, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 19/40] fcntl: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 19/40] fcntl: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 31/40] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt(), Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 28/40] overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 28/40] overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 37/40] fat: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 36/40] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 29/40] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 24/40] fs: make helpers idmap mount aware, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 40/40] generic/622: add fstests for idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
  - Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Eric W. Biederman
    - Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
      - Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Serge E. Hallyn
        
        Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
      - Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts, Serge E. Hallyn
- [PATCH v6 35/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 35/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP, Christoph Hellwig
    - Re: [PATCH v6 35/40] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP, Christoph Hellwig
- [PATCH v6 39/40] xfs: support idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 39/40] xfs: support idmapped mounts, Darrick J. Wong
    - Re: [PATCH v6 39/40] xfs: support idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
    - Re: [PATCH v6 39/40] xfs: support idmapped mounts, Christoph Hellwig
- [PATCH v6 34/40] fs: add mount_setattr(), Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 21/40] ioctl: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 21/40] ioctl: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 22/40] would_dump: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 25/40] apparmor: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 33/40] fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 32/40] fs: split out functions to hold writers, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 26/39] ima: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 27/40] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 27/40] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 38/40] ext4: support idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 20/40] init: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 20/40] init: handle idmapped mounts, Christoph Hellwig
- [PATCH v6 18/40] utimes: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 18/40] utimes: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 30/40] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 12/40] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 12/40] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 17/40] af_unix: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 17/40] af_unix: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 15/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate(), Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 15/40] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate(), Christoph Hellwig
- [PATCH v6 16/40] open: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 16/40] open: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
  - Re: [PATCH v6 16/40] open: handle idmapped mounts, Christoph Hellwig
- [PATCH v6 07/40] attr: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 09/40] xattr: handle idmapped mounts, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 09/40] xattr: handle idmapped mounts, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 06/40] inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 06/40] inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware, James Morris
- [PATCH v6 02/40] fs: add id translation helpers, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 02/40] fs: add id translation helpers, Vivek Goyal
- [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, Christian Brauner
  - Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, James Morris
  - Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, J. Bruce Fields
    - Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, Christian Brauner
      - Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, J. Bruce Fields
        
        Re: [PATCH v6 05/39] namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware, Christian Brauner
- [PATCH v6 01/40] mount: attach mappings to mounts, Christian Brauner
- Re: [PATCH v6 00/40] idmapped mounts, Serge E. Hallyn
[PATCH v3 0/3] Add error_report_end tracepoint to KFENCE and KASAN, Alexander Potapenko
- [PATCH 2/3] kfence: use error_report_end tracepoint, Alexander Potapenko
- [PATCH v3 1/3] tracing: add error_report_end trace point, Alexander Potapenko
- [PATCH 3/3] kasan: use error_report_end tracepoint, Alexander Potapenko
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Add error_report_end tracepoint to KFENCE and KASAN, Petr Mladek
  - Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Add error_report_end tracepoint to KFENCE and KASAN, Alexander Potapenko
    - Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Add error_report_end tracepoint to KFENCE and KASAN, Petr Mladek
[PATCH v16 00/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v16 01/11] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER, Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Mike Rapoport
  - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Matthew Wilcox
    - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Shakeel Butt
      - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Shakeel Butt
  - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Mike Rapoport
      - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Matthew Wilcox
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Roman Gushchin
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Shakeel Butt
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Shakeel Butt
      - Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting, Michal Hocko
- [PATCH v16 11/11] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2), Mike Rapoport
- [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
  - Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Michal Hocko
    - Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, David Hildenbrand
      - Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Mike Rapoport
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Christoph Lameter
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Christoph Lameter
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, Michal Hocko
        
        Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation, James Bottomley

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