I think 6811 is the right ref for this. 8481 is the one you put in an RFP ;-)
I still prefer my wording, but this should be sufficiently hard to misinterpret.
From: Job Snijders <job@xxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 8:48:51 PM
To: Randy Bush <randy@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Ben Maddison <benm@workonline.africa>; keyur@xxxxxxxxxx <keyur@xxxxxxxxxx>; sidrops@xxxxxxxx <sidrops@xxxxxxxx>; draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress.all@xxxxxxxx <draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress.all@xxxxxxxxx>; last-call@xxxxxxxx <last-call@xxxxxxxx>; gen-art@xxxxxxxx <gen-art@xxxxxxxx>; rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx <rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Last-Call] [Sidrops] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01
Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 8:48:51 PM
To: Randy Bush <randy@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Ben Maddison <benm@workonline.africa>; keyur@xxxxxxxxxx <keyur@xxxxxxxxxx>; sidrops@xxxxxxxx <sidrops@xxxxxxxx>; draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress.all@xxxxxxxx <draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress.all@xxxxxxxxx>; last-call@xxxxxxxx <last-call@xxxxxxxx>; gen-art@xxxxxxxx <gen-art@xxxxxxxx>; rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx <rjsparks@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Last-Call] [Sidrops] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01
On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 11:42:47AM -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
> > Having spend the better part of last week stepping a vendor through
> > exactly these semantics
>
> while there is no proof of termination of clue insertion, that a BGP/ROV
> *implementor* did not get it, justifies the hack.
>
> As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
> outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST
> apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811] Sec 2)
> against the origin Autonomous System number which will actually be
> put in the AS_PATH (see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the
> UPDATE to the peer.
Looks good to me.
Kind regards,
Job
> > Having spend the better part of last week stepping a vendor through
> > exactly these semantics
>
> while there is no proof of termination of clue insertion, that a BGP/ROV
> *implementor* did not get it, justifies the hack.
>
> As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and
> outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST
> apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811] Sec 2)
> against the origin Autonomous System number which will actually be
> put in the AS_PATH (see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the
> UPDATE to the peer.
Looks good to me.
Kind regards,
Job
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