Hi Stephen,
> .. information would be better able to track people compared to now.
This is not about people..
>Regardless of what one thinks of them, given that things like HIP and LISP exist, and try tackle the ID/LOC split, I see no benefit adding this extra layer of indirection with a privacy invasive "Unique and Permanent" identifier
>which seems to be the only non-overlapping part of this work - in fact I only see downsides.
FWIW,
This is also to enable security and access restrictions to the new breed of devices on the network (IoT or other mobility nodes). Just because of the fact that they are on the network with an address they should not be allowed to be accessible.
Authentication with a trusted IdP would enable establishing the type of the type of device, which then allows group based policies to be enforceable (a V2X node can talk to only same kind of node or a particular IoT can be accessed by only particular device).
As discussed earlier in the list perhaps https://tools.ietf.org/wg/abfab/ can be looked into build this federated system in the architecture document.
I also see you are arguing(unfortunately) against your https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 document, where this can be one more potential mitigation tool w.r.t device anonymity (apart from encrypt everything/TCPINC - which serves a different and important purpose for content privacy w.r.t monitoring).
I don't see a fully functional mapping system without any authentication into the system by the device/node for the mapping. This has been always the case in the cellular world and it seems we are all okay with it and today it's 80+% of the total traffic.
It would be great if you can suggest which can meet this objective in more balanced way...
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Uma C.