--On Wednesday, March 16, 2016 13:42 -0700 Tony Hain
<alh-ietf@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Michael StJohns wrote:
>...
>> Could you provide an educated guess on the size of the
>> intersection of those last two sets? 1? 10s? 100s? 1000s?
>> More? I'm trying to understand the amount of hyperbole
>> being slung about.
>...
> I have never setup or used Tor, so I may be off
> base, but it would appear that the IETF could run a Tor router
> with a bandwidth-throttled exit policy that blocks all
> addresses except a mirror pointed to by the ietf.onion name.
> Basically a public hidden service.
>...
Noting the above including the repeatedly-asked question of who
needs this and why the IETF should assume the costs and also
noting that we've discontinued mechanisms for accessing IETF
materials when too few people were using them (the RFC printing
and (postal) mailing service being only the most prominent
example), let me suggest something far more simple: It has
been firm IETF policy for a very long time that there are no
restrictions on mirrors of IETF files and data and
redistribution of IETF mailing lists. Assuming that the sum of
the number of people who want or need to access IETF materials
via TOR and the number of people who feel strongly about helping
the first group(s) protect themselves is non-trivial (from the
amount of impassioned discussion on the topic, we already know
that sum is not-zero), why don't those people simply set up an
appropriate mirror, establish whatever access mechanisms that
suit their needs and requirements, and go happily on their way?
That would avoid both the stresses on IETF services and staff
that concern Mike (and me) but also any disclosure to IETF
personnel about who was using the service and why -- disclosure
that, under the proposed privacy policy, might become public
information.
john