Michael StJohns wrote: > On 3/16/2016 3:47 PM, Adam Roach wrote: > > As is the nature of a service used by people who need to stay > > anonymous for their own safety, > > There's the set of TOR users, and there's the subset of TOR users that need > to have the property of "anonymity for safety", and then there's the set of > people who need/want access to the IETF. > > Could you provide an educated guess on the size of the intersection of > those last two sets? 1? 10s? 100s? 1000s? More? I'm trying to > understand the amount of hyperbole being slung about. > > Finally, are there any other methods besides Tor you can think of that > would give "anonymity for safety" while still providing access to the IETF > data? (Hint: asking a friend to photocopy paper or send you a usb stick.... > or...) I don't have any answer to your question, but a belief that it could grow and shift over time as governments change. Nobody has addressed the question from Antonio Prado about setting up ietf.onion. I have never setup or used Tor, so I may be off base, but it would appear that the IETF could run a Tor router with a bandwidth-throttled exit policy that blocks all addresses except a mirror pointed to by the ietf.onion name. Basically a public hidden service. Attackers could dos the throttle, but other than that, it would appear to remove the need for the worse-than-useless captcha while not opening up the IETF to abuse of the relay, and solve the access problem in the subject line. Tony