On 3/16/16 2:32 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
To my knowledge nobody else has raised the concern that that the Tor people are raising, and so we are being asked to specifically support Tor. Fine. That means we then need to consider the benefit/harm of our actions regarding who precisely we are helping. I asked that question honestly without an answer, but with concerns.
It's a little off topic, but I'll bite. I'm only replying in the hope that we can get past the sidelong aspersions that imply that these users are somehow undeserving of access.
This FAQ gives information in a far more thoughtful and comprehensive way than I could have hoped to regarding the users who make use of the TOR network: https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en
One of the less obvious things, though, is that switching back and forth between Tor and normal browsing on the same machine opens you up to certain fingerprinting attacks (cf. https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/unsanctioned-tracking/#limitations-of-technical-solutions). These attacks can allow determined adversaries to correlate your "regular" traffic with your Tor-routed traffic. These are mostly state-level actors, although some non-state institutions have demonstrated the ability to unmask Tor traffic using this class of technique.
So, in particular, the people you're blocking when you make Tor access impossible or difficult, are frequently going to be the ones who risk persecution, imprisonment, or death if they're discovered. Think human rights activists, citizen journalists, and anonymous whistleblowers in oppressive regimes. They're the ones who literally *cannot* afford to turn Tor off.
/a