Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption a waste of time?)

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On 25/08/2014 19:19, Ted Hardie wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 1:01 PM, Brian E Carpenter <
> brian.e.carpenter@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> RFC3205 (BCP56) said some of it a bit earlier, and was ignored. I'd say
>> that
>> RFC3639 was ignored too. For a practical lesson on the same topic, I
>> suggest
>> a critical study of all the RTCWEB drafts and of draft-ietf-dart-dscp-rtp.
>> I think they show the depth of the hole we are in.
>>
>>    Brian
>>
>>
> ​Just so I don't rudely put words in your mouth, I'd appreciate your
> unpacking what you practical lesson you anticipate learning there.

Actually I think my brain was a bit fuzzy when I wrote that, but the point
is that when we start bundling up things that don't naturally belong together,
because we are trying to defeat middleboxes that perform DPI (for traffic
analysis or any other reason) and/or IP header munging, we end up with
artificial complexity that is unlikely to result in reliable, efficient
communication.

An old story, I know. Since before RFC 2775 at least.

   Brian






[Index of Archives]     [IETF Annoucements]     [IETF]     [IP Storage]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux SCTP]     [Linux Newbies]     [Fedora Users]