I'm not quite clear why this draft should get an exemption from BCP 72.
Good arguments have been made why STARTTLS shouldn't be a MUST. I haven't
seen a convincing argument why it shouldn't be a SHOULD. That doesn't
preclude elaboration on that requirement in the AS.
Regards
Brian
On 31-Oct-24 08:53, Dave Crocker wrote:
On 10/30/2024 12:36 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
I'm sorry, this is the same document with a reference to PGP in it?
Why is that appropriate given this loudly proclaimed scope and not
STARTTLS?
Perhaps you missed my earlier notes observing that the document has a
long history of trying to cover a wide range of issues that go beyond
just specifying SMTP, and that it covers most of those incompletely, at
best. This is one of those.
So my return volley is: since its coverage of the realm of privacy and
security for email will not be complete, what is the benefit of adding
more, while still not being complete?
In oither words: because it does not actually help anyone.
Why are oblique references to DKIM/SPF in this section saying it's bad
ok but making them actual references people can follow without
esoterica not?
See above.
I just have trouble squaring this email with the actual text in question.
You are not alone.
Which is why this simple bis effort has taken years.
d/
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