Michael,
This is why I'm so concerned about why this happened and how to prevent something like this happening in the future. That's especially true when it involves security risks at a very large scale.
We have public IETF last calls, we have organized review teams, we have a published IESG agenda and announced IESG telechats, and we have substantive IESG comments and ballot positions in the datatracker. All of these are intended so that any community member can intervene right up to the point of IESG approval. Then we have a window of two months during which any community member can appeal an IESG decision. People who are not on ietf-announce@xxxxxxxx and last-call@xxxxxxxx have chosen not to participate in these parts of the IETF process. I really don't see what else we can do to detect and correct IESG errors. This long after the event, there is no process recourse, but a new BCP is always an option. Have you written a draft? Regards Brian Carpenter
