On Sat, Jun 5, 2021 at 11:48 PM Dean Willis <dean.willis@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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On Jun 5, 2021, 10:17 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: Mesh Callsign Service (ietf.org)
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This is exactly where I was trying to go with P2P-SIP/RELOAD but didn't get to, and it seems quite clever. The key is in using the distributed tree to store ephemeral but still relatively long-lived registrations, not massive or rapidly changing data.
Thanks,
The key is stripping out all the expensive parts of running DNS. Query is pushed onto the Mesh Service Providers. So all the registry does is to receive registration requests, validate the signatures on them and publish them if correct. The registry log is broadcast in real time to the service providers subscribing to it and is signed at regular intervals. Unlike the DNS, there is no single point of failure, the most an attacker can hope for is to take out one Service Provider, not 'the Internet' as would be the case if .com went down. Even taking out the callsign registry merely prevents updates reaching the service providers for a short while.
Cross notarization of the user and their Mesh Service Providers and the Mesh Service Providers and the callsign registry is sufficient to mesh all the signed notarized logs into a single entity. No party can defect undetected without the collusion of every other party. So Alice would have to be party to her own bamboozlement.
Once Alice has registered @alice, it is hers forever, it is bound to her public key credential. If she misbehaves, curation services can mark her account as being abusive. But they only have the power to describe, the power to accept or reject her content lies with Alice herself.
