On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 12:43 AM David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, 2022-05-02 at 19:33 +0200, Clemens Lang wrote: > > This is the reason why the proposal contains extensive methods to test > > whether things are going to break by modifying the crypto-policy or using > > bpftrace. Unfortunately there are hundreds of packages that depend on > > cryptographic libraries, and millions of different configurations out there. > > We can’t know ahead of time which ones of them are going to break, but the > > proposal provides tools and a long transition period to identify and fix > > them. > > When changes like this broke things for users in the past, we talked > about a way to present the "insufficient crypto/digest/protocol" as > just another failure like server certificate validation failures, so > the application/user can *choose* to accept and proceed, in real time. > > I'd like to see that as a *condition* of acceptance of further > restrictions in the policy. > > I really don't want us continuing to break things for Fedora users and > driving them back to the proprietary VPN clients. > > I am pleased to see some progress on this front with > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/GnutlsAllowlisting but it isn't > clear to me that this gives us what we need. We *want* to warn users > that their VPN server doesn't meet modern crypto standards. We don't > want to just blindly re-enable ancient crap and have it silently work. > But we also do *need* it to work, after we've warned the user about it. If the error returned from GnuTLS isn't enough to infer that you should make the user opt-in into a legacy algorithm and then counter the restriction on the next attempt with a priority string extension or gnutls_protocol_mark_enabled, please file a bug with GnuTLS and describe your case. Your continued input would be appreciated. Same with the other libraries if you meant other libraries. If you don't want to spend a connection on just probing, but instead prefer to connect no matter what and then query what has been negotiated to make the warn/abort decisions on the application layer that should also be possible. > Which is why handling it like a certificate validation failure seems to > be the right answer, but I'm happy to explore other solutions... but > preferably *not* solutions like "manually set > GNUTLS_SYSTEM_PRIORTY_FILE=/dev/null in your Fedora package to > explicitly override all the Fedora crypto policies". That suggestion > made me sad... :) +1, this is not the way _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
