Re: F37 Proposal: Strong crypto settings: phase 3, forewarning 1/2 (System-Wide Change proposal)

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On 5/3/22 18:41, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Mon, 2022-05-02 at 19:33 +0200, Clemens Lang wrote:
>> This is the reason why the proposal contains extensive methods to test
>> whether things are going to break by modifying the crypto-policy or using
>> bpftrace. Unfortunately there are hundreds of packages that depend on
>> cryptographic libraries, and millions of different configurations out there.
>> We can’t know ahead of time which ones of them are going to break, but the
>> proposal provides tools and a long transition period to identify and fix
>> them.
> 
> When changes like this broke things for users in the past, we talked
> about a way to present the "insufficient crypto/digest/protocol" as
> just another failure like server certificate validation failures, so
> the application/user can *choose* to accept and proceed, in real time.
> 
> I'd like to see that as a *condition* of acceptance of further
> restrictions in the policy.

Agreed — with one caveat.  It is quite possible that support for
some ancient protocols may be outright removed from upstream projects.
In that case, there is nothing Fedora can do.

> I really don't want us continuing to break things for Fedora users and
> driving them back to the proprietary VPN clients.
> 
> I am pleased to see some progress on this front with 
> https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/GnutlsAllowlisting but it isn't
> clear to me that this gives us what we need. We *want* to warn users
> that their VPN server doesn't meet modern crypto standards. We don't
> want to just blindly re-enable ancient crap and have it silently work.
> But we also do *need* it to work, after we've warned the user about it.
> 
> Which is why handling it like a certificate validation failure seems to
> be the right answer, but I'm happy to explore other solutions... but
> preferably *not* solutions like "manually set
> GNUTLS_SYSTEM_PRIORTY_FILE=/dev/null in your Fedora package to
> explicitly override all the Fedora crypto policies". That suggestion 
> made me sad... :)

I agree wholeheartedly.

-- 
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

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