Bill Nottingham wrote: >Ralf Corsepius (rc040203@xxxxxxxxxx) said: >> >- a record of who voted for what has been kept since this feature >> >was implemented: fedorahosted.org/elections/ticket/30 >> ><http://fedorahosted.org/elections/ticket/30> in 2009. All election >> >software that recorded this information has kept the information >> >private. >> >> You'd go to jail in Germany, if this SW was used for official >> elections. > >The laws prevent a voter-verifiable trail that their vote was recorded >and cast for who they intended to cast it for, in case of recounts or >similar occurences? > >I can see requiring it be purged after results are certified, but >there are systems that have required this level of verification be >available to voters. > >What certainly might be required is a mechanism to decouple the vote >itself from the account, so only the voter knows which record id is >theirs, etc. Since this discussion is now about national elections, which must be taken much more seriously than polls on release names: Can you propose a mechanism that allows the voter to verify his vote at a later time, but does not allow the voter to prove to someone else that he voted for the candidate he was paid to vote for, and does not allow a dominant father to verify that the family members voted like he ordered them to vote? This is not a trivial problem to solve. -- Björn Persson Sent from my computer.
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