Re: LUKS2 auth.encryption - do not use MORUS cipher

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On Tue, Jul 02, 2019 at 12:18:52 CEST, Jordan Glover wrote:
> On Monday, July 1, 2019 7:42 PM, Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > On Sun, 2019-06-30 at 11:00 +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
> >
> > > IMO the problem is that the winner will get more attraction
> > > (both from the implementation side as accelerations, but also
> > > some analysis). I think this will not happen with the variants.
> >
> > Haven't we had in the past some (non-real-world) "attacks" on AES which
> > affects either only AES128 or 256?

We have seen some key-shortening that was a lot worse for
AES-256 due to a worse key-schedule, but they have no real-world impact.
If you know something I missed and there is something worse,
I would appreciate a pointer. 

Real world "absolute security" is somewhere around 80...100 bit of
effective key lenght and that is against known-plaintext, i.e.
the absolute easiest attack possible. 

Regards,
Arno

-- 
Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718  FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF  B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
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