Re: LUKS2 auth.encryption - do not use MORUS cipher

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On Monday, July 1, 2019 7:42 PM, Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Sun, 2019-06-30 at 11:00 +0200, Milan Broz wrote:
>
> > IMO the problem is that the winner will get more attraction
> > (both from the implementation side as accelerations, but also
> > some analysis). I think this will not happen with the variants.
>
> Haven't we had in the past some (non-real-world) "attacks" on AES which
> affects either only AES128 or 256?
>
> It's as you've said in that one mail you've referenced... there's often
> more analysis on alogs which are actually used(usable) somewhere...
> which however also means, if implementations focus only on one single
> algorithm (arguably the two are the same alog, just different sizes)
> there is no fall back ready if anything should ever been suddenly found
> in that single algo.
>

AEGIS128, AEGIS256, and AEGIS128L are all different algos, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAEX_ruEDA9ZG+6aA_jTBSq-MM=pOrdxoJA2x0LPF3dkYk76kCQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/

Jordan

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