Difficult to answer in general. On a magnetic disk, it could be implemented in a way that the header and _any_ of its features are impossible to recover and the only thing left is an indicator of encrypted data. On a hubrid disk or SSD, it gets far more murky. The "sneak in" depends on the implementation. If it is an additional flag (bad, as this would require modification of the ehader), then yes. If decryption yields a modified master key or some special value derived from the master key, then no. Arno On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 21:28:55 CET, .. ink .. wrote: > if this feature is implemented as proposed.Can somebody tell a LUKS volume > has a "kill switch" simply by looking at the LUKS header? > > do destroyed key slots leaves traces of their destruction? ie,can a person > know a slot was once used simply by looking at the LUKS header? > > if this feature is implemented as proposed, can somebody "sneak in" a "kill > switch" by modifying a used/unused slot manually? > _______________________________________________ > dm-crypt mailing list > dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx > http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
