On 16.01.2014 15:11, Iggy wrote: > > > PS: An interesting, but only marginally helpful, byproduct of such a > feature is that on the off-chance that an adversary were attempting to > brute-force the password on their only copy of a volume (this is the > unlikely bit), and the nuke password had less entropy than the > decryption passphrase, then there is a chance the adversary themselves > would remove access to the data, without intervention from the target of > the attack, by accidentally brute-forcing the nuke password. You wouldn't brute force using the actual system, much too slow. You make a copy and brute force the data with something that allows as much key/s as possible. Which means you can't use the actual system. That also means the system that is actually used to do the brute-forcing won't implement the "nuke" capability (Assuming at least some competence on the attacker side) but may include code determine that it is a nuke key, because there has to be a way to identify that status at least after you found the correct passwort. Otherwise the feature would simply be impossible to implement. -- Matthias _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list dm-crypt@xxxxxxxx http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
