Re: nuke password to delete luks header

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I'd suppose the guarantees of [nuke] become weaker on SSD which is a common storage media at this point; especially for the mobile use-cases. 

Very interesting thread. 


> On Jan 16, 2014, at 12:28, ".. ink .." <mhogomchungu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> 
> if this feature is implemented as proposed.Can somebody tell a LUKS volume has a "kill switch" simply by looking at the LUKS header?
> 
> do destroyed key slots leaves traces of their destruction? ie,can a person know a slot was once used simply by looking at the LUKS header?
> 
> if this feature is implemented as proposed, can somebody "sneak in" a "kill switch" by modifying a used/unused slot manually?
> 
> 
> 
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