Re: Altering hash for existing volume

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 07:50:32PM +0200, martin f krafft wrote:
> also sprach Arno Wagner <arno@xxxxxxxxxxx> [2009.07.17.1945 +0200]:
> > SHA-1 is not vulnerable for this application. It may become
> > vulnerable one day, but currently it is just a bad idea for
> > user-generated certificates and the like, since the known
> > vulnerabilities require you to control both plain texts
> > and to know the hash (which you do when you have one
> > plain-text).
> 
> Sure, but I am still curious. And I think it should be possible to
> change the hash for new slots, which is why I filed Debian bug
> #537385

I agree to that. It is good to be prepared, even if this never 
develops into a real vulnerability. And a hash should be treated
as an interchangeable component anyways.

It also let us see what the Debian folks think. I fear a "not 
vulnerable, go away" type of response, but we will see.
 
> > However if you really want to rip it out, you have to create new
> > keys, since sha-1 is used in PBKDF2 and you cannot really reverse
> > that. You do however not need to recreate the filesystem. What you
> > do is to make a raw image backup of the decrypted device (not
> > mounted). Then you do your new encryption, and restore that into
> > the nnew decrypted device. Admittedly a filesystem backup and
> > recreation before restore is easuier. But since you have to hack
> > the PBKDF2 code anyways, the backup and restore is the easy part.
> 
> This sounds painful. ;)

Indeed ;-)

Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier 

---------------------------------------------------------------------
dm-crypt mailing list - http://www.saout.de/misc/dm-crypt/
To unsubscribe, e-mail: dm-crypt-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxx
For additional commands, e-mail: dm-crypt-help@xxxxxxxx



[Index of Archives]     [Device Mapper Devel]     [Fedora Desktop]     [ATA RAID]     [Fedora Marketing]     [Fedora Packaging]     [Fedora SELinux]     [Yosemite News]     [KDE Users]     [Fedora Tools]     [Fedora Docs]

  Powered by Linux