On Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 07:50:32PM +0200, martin f krafft wrote: > also sprach Arno Wagner <arno@xxxxxxxxxxx> [2009.07.17.1945 +0200]: > > SHA-1 is not vulnerable for this application. It may become > > vulnerable one day, but currently it is just a bad idea for > > user-generated certificates and the like, since the known > > vulnerabilities require you to control both plain texts > > and to know the hash (which you do when you have one > > plain-text). > > Sure, but I am still curious. And I think it should be possible to > change the hash for new slots, which is why I filed Debian bug > #537385 I agree to that. It is good to be prepared, even if this never develops into a real vulnerability. And a hash should be treated as an interchangeable component anyways. It also let us see what the Debian folks think. I fear a "not vulnerable, go away" type of response, but we will see. > > However if you really want to rip it out, you have to create new > > keys, since sha-1 is used in PBKDF2 and you cannot really reverse > > that. You do however not need to recreate the filesystem. What you > > do is to make a raw image backup of the decrypted device (not > > mounted). Then you do your new encryption, and restore that into > > the nnew decrypted device. Admittedly a filesystem backup and > > recreation before restore is easuier. But since you have to hack > > the PBKDF2 code anyways, the backup and restore is the easy part. > > This sounds painful. ;) Indeed ;-) Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@xxxxxxxxxxx GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F ---- Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier --------------------------------------------------------------------- dm-crypt mailing list - http://www.saout.de/misc/dm-crypt/ To unsubscribe, e-mail: dm-crypt-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxx For additional commands, e-mail: dm-crypt-help@xxxxxxxx