Re: after sidux upgrade: "Can not access device" with 1 of 4 luks partitions

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On Wed, 18 Feb 2009 16:23:30 +0100
Arno Wagner <arno@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 18, 2009 at 03:15:32PM +0100, orinoco wrote:
> [...]
> So the header looks good but open fails. Most likely
> is a defective key block. No way to repair that.

Too bad!
I guess dm-crypt did overwrite the luks header with a random key for a
swap partition, but I'd like to know what did actually happen, and if
there is a chance to brute-force-attack single bytes in case the key in
the header were not overwritten completely.

> > > There may be other fields you absolutely need, but 
> > > 32-64 bits or so can be brute-forced today without too 
> > > much hassle, depending on what actually need to be done 
> > > for a try. This still costs significant effort and 
> > > may cause significant cost.
> > >
> > > The other thing is to think about how much your data is 
> > > worth. It may be cheaptest to regard this as a lost
> > > cause from the beginning. 
> > I would consider it "nice to have it back" and worth some effort. 
> > It isn't (or wasn't) vital information.
> Good to know. I think you have done all the easy steps.
> My advice is to cut your losses and start over with a new
> encrypted partition.

I guess I will keep it as-is-as as a memorial. And maybe quantum
computers in the future will be able to decrypt the information again
=:-}
 
> > > Although I would recomment at least 
> > > one in-detail look at the header. It may basically still 
> > > be there.
> > There is a "complete" header information I get from luksDump (see
> > above), but it does not seem to work with luksOpen and the original
> > passphrase.
> > BTW I noticed that my system keeps mixing the sdXX device order.
> > After a reboot it changed again. 
> That is really bad, expecially with automated swap creation.

I turned it off completely although there shouldn't be any partition
left to mix with it. I'm fed up with encrypted swap. 

> What I would advise is that you delegate the swap creation
> to a script, that at least checks partition size before 
> trashing it. You may also want to, e.g., not use the first 
> kB of the partition and put a magic number in there that you 
> also check.
> Come to think of it, you could also put your swap on an 
> one-partition RAID1 and then access it by its /dev/md<number>
> (set partition type to autodetection). That should be stable
> and circumvent your problem.

I will consider that.
In the sidux form they advised me to label the swap partition. Might be
another solution to kick off all /dev/sdXX entries in the fstab and
crypttab files and make mounting unique.

Thanks for your help.
 
regards

Carsten


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