Re: Intel's encryption in Eaglelake or should we trust hardware encryption?

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> There is a fundamental problem with your argumentation. Of course all 
> this is possible by attacking the software as well. Maybe I was not 
> clear, but I was talking about additional risks from using hardware,
> as anything else does not make sense.

The additional risk is as you had written before that its much harder
to verify the correctness of the implementation. So its much harder
to detect backdoors for site channel attacks.

wof
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