Re: the cold-boot attack

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* Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> markus reichelt wrote:
> > * Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > 
> >> Our paper is clear.
> > 
> > Link?
> > 
> 
> Hi Markus,
> 
> Here's our official paper distribution point. I suggest the youtube
> video as well, it's pretty nicely done:
> http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/

I'm subscribed to this list but did not receive Boyd's original mail
with the link. Somehow mails on this list make it to the archive but
not always to people who are subscribed.

Note to self: http://citp.princeton.edu.nyud.net/pub/coldboot.pdf

I'm reading it now. 

I don't use flash so I'll skip the youtube video, there are pictures
in the pdf as well.



> > As already stated numerious times, if theres root access (eg full
> > access to a machine's memory, including a virtual machine) it's a
> > piece of cake to get one's hands on the key.
> 
> Our attack works even after a full power off of the system.

I'd like to add "directly". And one still needs direct access to the
machine in question.

It reminds me of the procedure wiping CMOS BIOS data to reset
settings to default values. (Yes I know about the battery :-)


> > IIRC, key scrubbing has been implemented in loop-AES because some
> > Gutmann paper mentioned possible key recovery from imprinted RAM
> > patterns.
> 
> Yes. This isn't the same issue.

Do you know if more extensive research has been done on the "other"
issue?

-- 
left blank, right bald

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