Re: the cold-boot attack

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* Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Our paper is clear.

Link?

As already stated numerious times, if theres root access (eg full
access to a machine's memory, including a virtual machine) it's a
piece of cake to get one's hands on the key. Key scrubbing in
loop-AES only slightly complicates the issue, but as it has been
publicly proven to work to snatch ssh keypairs from memory, it's just
emphasising an attack vector that exists by design. And all the other
publicly known linux crypto implementations suffer from it.

IIRC, key scrubbing has been implemented in loop-AES because some
Gutmann paper mentioned possible key recovery from imprinted RAM
patterns.

Please, before stating your claims be sure to clearly point out your
attack vector.

-- 
left blank, right bald

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