markus reichelt wrote: > * Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Our paper is clear. > > Link? > Hi Markus, Here's our official paper distribution point. I suggest the youtube video as well, it's pretty nicely done: http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/ > As already stated numerious times, if theres root access (eg full > access to a machine's memory, including a virtual machine) it's a > piece of cake to get one's hands on the key. Our attack works even after a full power off of the system. >Key scrubbing in > loop-AES only slightly complicates the issue, but as it has been > publicly proven to work to snatch ssh keypairs from memory, it's just > emphasising an attack vector that exists by design. And all the other > publicly known linux crypto implementations suffer from it. Yes. Of course. > > IIRC, key scrubbing has been implemented in loop-AES because some > Gutmann paper mentioned possible key recovery from imprinted RAM > patterns. Yes. This isn't the same issue. > > Please, before stating your claims be sure to clearly point out your > attack vector. > Feel free to read the paper and let us know what you think. Regards, Jacob Appelbaum - Linux-crypto: cryptography in and on the Linux system Archive: http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/
